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 A General Framework for Sound
Assumption-based Argumentation Dialogues
Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni
Imperial College London, United Kingdom
Abstract
We propose a formal model for argumentation-based dialogues between agents,
using assumption-based argumentation (ABA) as the underlying argumentation
framework. Thus, the dialogues amount to conducting an argumentation process
in ABA. The model is given in terms of ABA-specific utterances, debate trees and
forests implicitly built during and drawn from dialogues, legal-move functions
(amounting to protocols) and outcome functions. The model is generic in that it
is not restricted to any specific dialogue types and can be used to support a wide
range thereof. We prove a formal connection between dialogues and three well-
known argumentation semantics (i.e. grounded, admissible and ideal extensions),
by giving soundness results for our dialogue models with respect to these seman-
tics. Thus, our dialogues can be seen as a distributed mechanism for successfully
determining acceptability of claims (with respect to the semantics considered),
while constructing argumentation frameworks and arguments for these claims.
Keywords: Argumentation, Dialogue, Agents, Semantics
1. Introduction
Argumentation-based dialogue systems have attracted considerable research
interest in recent years (e.g. see [33, 27]), largely due to the need for agents to
communicate and agree in multi-agent systems. Indeed, argumentation is a pow-
erful reasoning abstraction where conflicting positions or opinions are evaluated
against one another in order to resolve conflicts. Argumentation has been used
quite extensively in AI in the last two decades to support a number of applica-
tions and address a number of problems (e.g. see [4, 5, 38] for an overview). To
support this line of research, several argumentation frameworks have been pro-
posed through the years, including [11, 7] and many more (see for example [1]
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for a recent overview of some approaches). The modern study of formal dialogue
systems for argumentation can be deemed to have started with Charles Hamblin’s
work [24]. The topic was initially studied within philosophical logic and argu-
mentation theory [26, 43]. Subsequently, researchers from the field of AI & law
[23, 31] and multi-agent systems [3, 30] have looked into dialogue systems as
well.
This paper presents a two-agent argumentation-based dialogue model, using
Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) [7, 12, 40, 42] for the representation of
arguments and attacks, and for determining “success” of dialogues. ABA is well-
suited as a foundation for argumentation-based dialogues for a number of reasons.
It is a general purpose argumentation framework with several applications (e.g.
see [12, 40, 42]) including applications requiring dialogues between agents [20].
It is a structured argumentation frameworks, so that a dialogue model based on it
can allow the collective construction of arguments and attacks, and a distributed
evaluation of “success”, rather than forcing, as when using abstract argumenta-
tion [11], for example as in [36], that arguments and attacks are determined and/or
constructed individually by agents or collectively but prior to dialogues. At the
same time, it is an instance of abstract argumentation [15, 40] and it admits ab-
stract argumentation as an instance [40], thus allowing our dialogue model to
accommodate, as a special case, the communication and evaluation of abstract
arguments as well. There are several other structured argumentation frameworks
available as a basis for argumentation-based dialogues, notably logic-based argu-
mentation [5], DeLP [22] and, more recently, ASPIC+ [34] (see [1] for a recent
survey of all these structured argumentation frameworks). Of these, only ASPIC+
is an instance of abstract argumentation and allows abstract argumentation dia-
logues to be generated, if required by applications. ASPIC+ is a generalisation of
ABA and has been designed to admit ABA as an instance [34]. Thus, our ABA-
based dialogue model can also be seen as a dialogue model based on ASPIC+, and
extending the functionalities and properties of dialogue models based on precur-
sors of ASPIC+ (e.g. [32, 33], as we will discuss later). Another essential feature
of ABA, for the purposes of this article, is that it is equipped with provably correct
computational mechanisms with respect to several semantics [14, 15, 41]. We rely
upon aspects of these mechanisms, as well as their soundness, in order to prove
our formal soundness results.
An ABA framework consists of rules, assumptions, and contraries, specified
in a logical language. Informally, rules and assumptions form deductions (argu-
ments); contraries of assumptions provide means of specifying counter-arguments
(attacks) against arguments. Within an ABA framework, sets of arguments are
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deemed “acceptable” if they fulfil certain properties, e.g., under the semantics of
admissible extensions [7, 12], a set of arguments does not attack itself and attacks
all arguments that attack it. Then, claims are deemed “acceptable” if they are
supported by (are conclusions of) arguments that belong to “acceptable” sets.
Our dialogue model makes use of the same building blocks as ABA, in that a
dialogue is composed of utterances whose content may be a rule, an assumption,
a contrary, or a claim whose “acceptability” needs to be ascertained. In addition,
the content of utterances may be a pass, amounting to the agent contributing no
information to the dialogue at the time of the utterance. Dialogues start with an
agent putting forward a claim. Our dialogue model is generic in that it does not
focus on any particular dialogue type, e.g. information seeking, persuasion or
negotiation [43], but can be used to support several such dialogue types [17, 18,
19, 20].
Through dialogues, the participating agents construct a “joint knowledge base”
by pooling all disclosed information to form an ABA framework. The ABA frame-
work drawn from a dialogue δ, referred to as Fδ, contains all information that the
two agents have uttered in the dialogue and gives the context for examining the
acceptability of the claim of the dialogue. Conceptually, a dialogue is “success-
ful” if its claim is “acceptable” in Fδ. Note that the claim of a dialogue may be
a belief, and acceptability thereof an indication that the agents may legitimately
uphold the belief, or a course of actions, and acceptability thereof an indication
that the agents may legitimately choose to adhere to it. Indeed, acceptability has
so far shown to be an important criterion for assessing the outcome of various
types of dialogues [17, 18, 19, 20], and thus “successful” dialogues can be seen as
building blocks of a widely deployable framework for distributed interactions in
multi-agent systems. We focus here on three forms of “acceptability” and “suc-
cess”, with respect to three well-known argumentation semantics.
Rather than checking “success” retrospectively, we define legal-move func-
tions guaranteed to generate “successful” dialogues if a limited form of retrospec-
tive checking by means of outcome functions succeeds. Given a dialogue, a legal-
move function returns a set of allowed utterances that can be uttered to extend the
dialogue. Legal-move functions can thus be viewed as dialogue protocols. Out-
come functions are mappings from dialogues to true / false. Given a dialogue, an
outcome function returns true if a certain property holds for that dialogue.
In summary, the main contributions of this work are: (1) a generic formal
model for ABA-based dialogues; and (2) the link between this model and standard
argumentation semantics (of grounded, admissible and ideal extensions) to define
success of these dialogues. We focus on these three semantics as they allow to cap-
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ture general forms of credulous reasoning (admissible) and two well-understood
forms of sceptical reasoning (grounded and ideal), and are thus suitable for a wide
range of problems. Our soundness results are obtained by mapping the debate
tree/debate forest generated from a dialogue onto an abstract dispute tree [14]
that is known to sanction the “acceptability” of the claim [14, 15]. These debate
tree/forest can be seen as a commitment store [43] holding information that agents
disclose and share using the dialogue.
The paper generalises and extends the initial proposal of ABA-based dialogues
in [16] in several ways. Firstly, this paper shows soundness results with respect to
grounded, admissible and ideal extensions, rather than just admissible extensions
as in [16]. Secondly, [16] uses “dialectical trees”, which are mapped onto the
concrete dispute trees of [14] whereas this work uses a new notion of debate trees
(see Definition 8.1), which are mapped onto the abstract dispute trees of [14],
directly allowing to use soundness results from [15]. Moreover, [16] defines di-
alectical trees constructively, whereas this work defines debate trees declaratively,
allowing to prove some novel results (e.g. Lemma 11.1). Thirdly, in this paper
we define debate forests and use them to study unrestricted dialogues, completely
absent from [16], which studies focused dialogues only.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background on ABA.
Section 3 sets the foundation of our dialogue framework and Section 4 introduces
generic notions of legal-move and outcome functions. Section 5 defines specific
kinds of these functions to generate special kinds of dialogues, guaranteed to draw
ABA frameworks. Section 6 defines the three notions of “successful” dialogue we
are after, in a non-constructive way. Section 7 starts refining the dialogue frame-
work by introducing new legal-move and outcome functions that enforce core
properties of “successful” dialogues, constructively. Section 8 presents debate
trees that are then used to define legal-move and outcome functions, in Section 9,
allowing to construct “successful” dialogues and prove our soundness results in
Sections 10 and 11, for focused and unrestricted dialogues, respectively. Sec-
tion 12 discusses related works and Section 13 concludes.
The proposed dialogue model relies upon several notions and formal defini-
tions: the most important amongst these are summarised in a glossary in Appendix
A, to aid readibility.
2. Background: Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA)
An ABA framework is a tuple 〈L,R,A, C〉 where
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• 〈L,R〉 is a deductive system, with a language L and a set of inference rules
R of the form β0 ← β1, . . . , βm(m > 0) or β0 ← with, for i = 0, . . . ,m,
βi ∈ L, and, if m > 1, then βi 6= βj for i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m;1
• A ⊆ L is a (non-empty) set, whose elements are referred to as assumptions,
• C is a total mapping from A into 2L − {{}}, where each c ∈ C(α) is a
contrary of α.2
Basically, ABA frameworks can be defined for any logic specified by means of in-
ference rules. Some of the sentences in the underlying language are assumptions.
Given β0 ← β1, . . . , βm or β0 ←, β0 is referred as the head and β1, . . . , βm
or the empty sequence, respectively, as the body. We will use the following no-
tation: Head(β0 ← β1, . . . , βm) = β0; Body(β0 ← β1, . . . , βm) = β1, . . . , βm,
Head(β0 ←) = β0, and Body(β0 ←) is empty. An ABA framework is flat iff no
assumption is the head of a rule. We will focus on flat ABA frameworks, so as to
be able to use results valid for them (see later).
Example 2.1. Let AF1 = 〈L1,R1,A1, C1〉 be as follows:
• L1 = {a, b, c, p, q, r, s},
• R1 = {p← a, q ← b, s, r ← c, s←},
• A1 = {a, b, c},
• C1(a) = {q}, C1(b) = {p}, C1(c) = {r, q}.
AF1 is a flat ABA framework. Let AF2 = 〈L2,R2,A2, C2〉 be as follows:
• L2 = {a, p, q},
• R2 = {p← a},
• A2 = {p, a},
• C2(a) = {q}, C2(p) = {q}.
AF2 is a non-flat ABA framework, as p is both the head of a rule (p← a) and an
assumption.
1Standard ABA does not require βi 6= βj , but this can be imposed without loss of generality.
As an example, consider two ABA frameworks, identical except for rule p ← q, q in the first and
rule p ← q in the second. Then, trivially, p (or any other sentence in the underlying language) is
admissible (or complete, grounded, preferred, ideal, defined later) in the first iff it is in the second.
2Here, as in [21], we (equivalently) define the contrary of an assumption as a total mapping
from an assumption to a (non-empty) set of sentences, instead of a mapping from an assumption
to a sentence as in the original ABA. This lends itself better to a dialogical setting, as agents may
hold different sentences as contrary to the same assumption.
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In ABA, informally, arguments are deductions of claims supported by sets
of assumptions, and attacks against arguments are directed at the assumptions in
their supports, and are given by arguments with an assumption’s contrary as their
claim. Formally, given an ABA framework 〈L,R,A, C〉, an argument for β ∈ L
supported by A ⊆ A is a tree with nodes labelled by sentences in L or by τ 3, such
that
1. the root is labelled by β
2. for every node N
• if N is a leaf then N is labelled either by an assumption in A or by τ ;
• if N is not a leaf and β0 is the label of N , then there is an inference
rule β0 ← β1, ..., βm(m ≥ 0) and either m = 0 and the child of N is τ
or m > 0 and N has m children, labelled by β1, ..., βm (respectively)
3. A is the set of all assumptions labelling the leaves.
The shorthand A ` β is used to denote an argument for β supported by A. Given
argument A ` β, A is referred to as the support and β as the claim. Figure 1
illustrates this notion of argument for AF1 in Example 2.1.
p q r
a
OO
b
99
s
ee
c
OO
τ
OO
{a} ` p {b} ` q {c} ` r
Figure 1: Arguments in Example 2.1, as trees (above) and using standard shorthand (below).
With the notion of arguments and contrary of assumption, attack in an ABA
framework is defined as follows:
• an argument A1 ` β1 attacks an argument A2 ` β2 iff the claim β1 of the
first argument is a contrary of one of the assumptions in the support A2 of
the second argument (i.e., ∃α ∈ A2 such that β1 ∈ C(α));
3The symbol τ is such that τ /∈ L. τ stands for “true” and intuitively represents the empty
body of rules.
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• a set of arguments As attacks a set of arguments Bs if some argument in As
attacks some argument in Bs;
• a set of assumptions A1 attacks a set of assumptions A2 iff an argument
supported by a subset of A1 attacks an argument supported by a subset of
A2.
Example 2.2. (Continuation of Example 2.1) In AF1, we have that {a} ` p
attacks {b} ` q, {b} ` q attacks {a} ` p, {b} ` q attacks {c} ` r, and {c} ` r
attacks {c} ` r. Also, {{a} ` p} attacks {{b} ` q, {c} ` r} and {a} attacks
{b}, {b} attacks {a, c}, {b} attacks {c}, and {c} attacks any set of assumptions
containing c.
With argument and attack defined, all argumentation semantics introduced in
abstract argumentation [11] can be applied in ABA. These semantics can be de-
fined for assumptions, as in [8, 7], or, equivalently, for arguments [15, 40]. For-
mally, given F = 〈L,R,A, C〉, sets of assumptions can be deemed to be accept-
able according to the following semantics4:
• a set of assumptions is admissible (in F) iff it does not attack itself and it
attacks all A ⊆ A that attack it;
• a set of assumptions is complete (in F) iff it is admissible (in F) and con-
tains all assumptions it defends (inF), where a set of assumptionsA defends
another set of assumptions A′ (in F) iff A attacks all sets of assumptions
that attack A′;
• a set of assumptions is grounded (in F) iff it the least set (with respect to
⊆) that is complete (in F);
• a set of assumptions is preferred (in F) iff it is maximally (with respect to
⊆) admissible (in F);
• a set of assumptions is ideal (inF) iff it is an admissible set (inF) contained
in all preferred sets (in F);
In this paper, we will also use the following notions of individual arguments
and sentences being acceptable according to different argumentation semantics:
4This is not an exhaustive list, but includes all semantics relevant to this paper.
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• an argument A ` β is admissible (complete, grounded, preferred, ideal)
(in F) supported by A′ ⊆ A iff A ⊆ A′ and A′ is admissible (complete,
grounded, preferred, ideal, respectively) (in F);
• a sentence is admissible (complete, grounded, preferred, ideal) (in F) iff
it is the claim of an argument that is admissible (complete, grounded, pre-
ferred, ideal, respectively) (in F) supported by some A ⊆ A.
In this paper we will focus on the admissible, grounded and ideal semantics.
Example 2.3. (Continuation of Example 2.2) The sets of assumptions {a}, {b},
{} are all admissible (and no other set is admissible). Amongst these, {} is the
only grounded as well as the only ideal set, and {a} and {b} are the only preferred
sets.
The sets of arguments {{a} ` p}, {{b} ` q}, {{a} ` a}, {{b} ` b}, {{a} `
p, {a} ` a}, {{b} ` q, {b} ` b}, and {} are all admissible (and no other set is
admissible). Amongst these, {} is the only grounded as well as the only ideal
set, and {{a} ` p, {a} ` a} and {{b} ` q, {b} ` b} are the only preferred sets.
Finally, p and q are both admissible, whereas no sentence is grounded or ideal.
We will use the abstract dispute trees of [14] to prove some of our results later,
where an abstract dispute tree for an argument A (in an ABA framework F) is a
(possibly infinite) tree T a such that:5
1. every node of T a holds an argument B (in F) and is labelled by either pro-
ponent (P) or opponent (O), but not both, denoted by L : B, for L ∈ {P,O};
2. the root of T a is a P node holding A;
3. for every P node N holding an argument B, and for every argument C that
attacks B (in F), there exists a child of N , which is an O node holding C;
4. for every O node N holding an argument B, there exists exactly one child
of N which is a P node holding an argument which attacks (in F) some
assumption α in the support of B.6 α is said to be the culprit in B;
5. there are no other nodes in T a except those given by 1-4 above.
5Here, a stands for ’abstract’. Also, proponent and opponent are roles/fictitious players rather
than actual agents, and abstract dispute trees are not to be confused withy a dialogical model. We
will return to this later.
6An argument attacks an assumption if the argument supports a contrary of the assumption.
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P : {a} ` p
O : {b} ` q
OO
P : {a} ` p
OO
...
Figure 2: Admissible abstract dispute tree for Example 2.4.
The set of all assumptions in (the support of arguments hold of) the P nodes in T a
is called the defence set of T a.
Abstract dispute trees can be used as the basis for computing various argu-
mentation semantics as follows, given an ABA framework F :
• An abstract dispute tree T a is admissible iff no culprit in the argument of
an O labelling node in T a belongs to the defence set of T a. The defence set
of an admissible abstract dispute tree for an argument A (in F) is admissible
(Theorem 5.1 in [14]), and thus A as well as the sentence in the root node of
A is admissible (in F).
• An abstract dispute tree is grounded iff it is admissible and finite. The
defence set of a grounded abstract dispute tree T a for an argument A (in F)
is contained in the grounded set [12], and thus A as well as the sentence in
the root node of A is grounded (in F).
• An abstract dispute tree is ideal iff for no O node N in the tree there exists
an admissible abstract dispute tree with root N (in F). The defence set of
an ideal abstract dispute tree for an argument is ideal (Theorem 3.4 in [15]),
and thus A as well as the sentence in the root node of A is ideal (in F).
Example 2.4. (Continuation of Example 2.3) Figure 2 gives an example of an
(infinite) admissible dispute tree, with (admissible) defence set {a}.
3. Basic Dialogue Notions
This section presents the basis of our model of argumentation-based dialogues
between (two) agents, a1 and a2. In our dialogue model, agents can utter claims
(to be debated), rules, assumptions and contraries, or pass. Thus, dialogues allow
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agents to “build” a shared repository of components of ABA frameworks. Note
that a1, a2 may or may not be equipped with ABA frameworks. ABA is used as
a lingua franca in the spirit of the Argument Interchange Format (AIF) [9, 37], in
the sense that, internally, agents can use knowledge representation formalisms dif-
ferent from ABA, but, while communicating, agents convert their internal repre-
sentation into ABA. Even if a1, a2 are equipped with ABA frameworks, the agents
may or may not be truthful, in that, for example, an agent may utter “made-up”
rules which do not exist in its ABA framework.
We assume the agents share a common logical language L and a (non-empty,
possibly infinite) set ID that:
• is totally ordered, with the ordering given by <;
• contains a special element ID0 which is the least element with respect to <.
Example 3.1. We can choose ID to be the set of non-negative integers, N ∪ {0}.
The total order relation< is the standard< relation, such that for a, b ∈ ID, a < b
iff there exists some c ∈ N such that a+ c = b. For this choice of ID, ID0 is 0.
For simplicity, in all our examples ID and ID0 are as in Example 3.1. How-
ever, several other choices are possible, including a closed interval of real numbers
and a set of strings (with< the lexicographic order). Utterances are defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 3.1. An utterance from agent ai to agent aj (i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j) is a
tuple 〈ai, aj, T, C, ID〉 where:
• C (the content) is of one of the following forms:
- claim(χ) for some χ ∈ L (a claim),
- rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βm) for some β0, . . . , βm ∈ L with m ≥ 0 (a rule),
- asm(α) for some α ∈ L (an assumption),
- ctr(α, β) for some α, β ∈ L (a contrary),
- a pass sentence pi, such that pi /∈ L.
• ID ∈ ID \ {ID0} (the identifier).
• T ∈ ID (the target); we impose that T < ID.
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We refer to an utterance with content pi as a pass utterance, to an utterance with
content claim( ) as a claim utterance7 and to an utterance with content other than
pi or claim( ) as regular. We say that an utterance from ai is made by ai.
Note that our utterances are generic and not tailored to any specific types of
dialogues, but can be used to provide specialised semantics for specific dialogue
types (such as persuasion and inquiry [43]), e.g. following the lines of [17, 18, 19,
20].
Notation 3.1. We use U to denote the set of all possible utterances as in Defini-
tion 3.1, given L, and U i to denote all utterances from ai in U , i.e. of the form
〈ai, , , , 〉.
Intuitively, when the content of an utterance is pi, the utterance indicates that
the agent making it does not have or want to contribute any information (i.e. claim,
rule, assumption, contrary) that can be added to the dialogue at that point, either
because no such information is in the agent’s possession or because the agent
chooses not to disclose such information. The target of an utterance is the identi-
fier of some earlier utterance in the dialogue, as we will see next.
Definition 3.2. A dialogue Daiaj(χ) (between ai and aj , i, j ∈ {1,2}, i 6= j, for
χ∈L), is a sequence 〈u1,. . . ,un〉, n≥0, where each ul, l = 1,. . . ,n, is in U , and:
1. u1 = 〈ai, aj, , , 〉;
2. the content of ul is claim(χ) iff l = 1;
3. the target of pass and claim utterances is ID0; the target of regular utterances
is not ID0;
4. for every utterance ul = 〈 , , T, , 〉, such that l > 1 and T 6= ID0, there
exists some uk = 〈 , , , C, T 〉, such that C 6= pi and k < l;
5. for 0 ≤ k < l ≤ n, if IDl is the identifier of ul and IDk is the identifier of
uk then IDk < IDl.
Given a dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 and an utterance u, we define δ◦u = 〈u1, . . . , un,
u〉. Given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, we say that each ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is in δ.
Notation 3.2. We use D to denote the set of all dialogues as in Definition 3.2.
7Throughout, stands for an anonymous variable as in Prolog.
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Example 3.2. Given L = {s, a, b, c, d, g, q, r}, and ID = N ∪ {0} with ID0 = 0,
a possible dialogue Da1a2(s) is as follows:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(a, q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(q ← b), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, asm(b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, ctr(b, c), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, asm(c), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 9, ctr(c, r), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 11〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 12〉
Our dialogue model allows pass utterances being uttered at any moment through-
out a dialogue. Given any dialogue, the pi-pruned sequence obtained from the
dialogue consists of all regular utterances in the dialogue.
Example 3.3. The pi-pruned sequence obtained from the dialogue δ in Exam-
ple 3.2 is δ′ as follows:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(a, q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(q ← b), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, asm(b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, ctr(b, c), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, asm(c), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 9, ctr(c, r), 10〉
Here δ′ = 〈u′1, . . . , u′9〉 where u′1 = u1, u′2 = u3, u′3 = u4, u′4 = u5, u′5 = u6, u′6 =
u7, u
′
7 = u8, u
′
9 = u10, for ui = 〈 , , , , i〉 in the original δ.
Note that, since no regular utterance has a pass utterance as its target (by con-
dition 3 in Definition 3.2), the target of every utterance in a pi-pruned sequence
is guaranteed to be in this sequence. Also, since the first utterance in a dialogue
can never be a pass utterance (by condition 2 of Definition 3.2), the first utterance
in a pi-pruned sequence is always the same as the first utterance in the original
dialogue. Moreover, it is trivially true that, for any utterance u, if u is not in a
dialogue δ, u is not in the pi-pruned sequence of δ.
By means of dialogues agents “build” a shared repository of components of
an ABA framework, defined as follows:
Definition 3.3. The (argumentation) framework drawn from a dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . ,
un〉 ∈ D is Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 where:
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• Rδ = {ρ|rl(ρ) is the content of some ui in δ};
• Aδ = {α|asm(α) is the content of some ui in δ};
• for any α ∈ Aδ, Cδ(α) = {β|ctr(α, β) is the content of some ui in δ}.
Clearly, the framework drawn from a dialogue represents all information that
has been disclosed by the two agents in the dialogue.
Example 3.4. The framework drawn from the dialogue δ in Example 3.2 is Fδ =
〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, in which
• Aδ = {a, b, c};
• Rδ = {s← a, q ← b};
• Cδ(a) = {q}, Cδ(b) = {c}, Cδ(c) = {r}.
Note that the framework drawn from the dialogues in Example 3.4 is an ABA
framework, but, in general, the framework drawn from a dialogue may or may not
be an ABA framework, as we will discuss later in Section 5.
3.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
Throughout the paper, we will illustrate our model in the context of the fol-
lowing example, adapted from the movie Twelve Angry Men, an example of ar-
gumentation-based collaborative reasoning [2]. Here, twelve jurors need to decide
whether to condemn a boy, accused of murder, or acquit him, after a trial where
two witnesses have provided evidence against the boy. According to the law,
the jurors should acquit the boy if they do not believe that the trial has proven him
guilty convincingly. We focus on the reasoning of two of the jurors: juror 8, played
by Henry Fonda (a1), and juror 9, played by Joseph Sweeney (a2). We can model
their exchanges of opinions as the two-agents dialogue δ = Da1a2(boy innocent)
in Table 1. Here, a1 starts the dialogue by putting forward the claim that the boy
is innocent (boy innocent). Then both agents contribute rules, assumptions and
contraries for and against the claim (directly or indirectly). The content of utter-
ances in this dialogue should be self-explanatory. For example, boy innocent ←
boy not proven guilty says that the boy should be deemed to be innocent if he
cannot be proven guilty. A natural language reading of this dialogue is in Table 2.
The framework drawn from this dialogue δ is Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 where
• Aδ = {boy not proven guilty, w1 is believable, w2 is believable};
• Rδ = {boy innocent← boy not proven guilty,
boy proven guilty ← w1 is believable,
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Table 1: Dialogue δ for Example 3.1.
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(boy innocent), 1〉
〈a2, a1, 1, rl(boy innocent← boy not proven guilty), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(boy not proven guilty), 3〉
〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(boy not proven guilty, boy proven guilty), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, rl(boy proven guilty ← w1 is believable), 5〉
〈a2, a1, 5, asm(w1 is believable), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(w1 is believable, w1 not believable), 7〉
〈a1, a2, 7, rl(w1 not believable← w1 contradicted by w2), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, rl(w1 contradicted by w2←), 9〉
〈a2, a1, 4, rl(boy proven guilty ← w2 is believable), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 10, asm(w2 is believable), 11〉
〈a2, a1, 11, ctr(w2 is believable, w2 not believable), 12〉
〈a1, a2, 12, rl(w2 not believable← w2 has poor eyesight), 13〉
〈a2, a1, 13, rl(w2 has poor eyesight←), 14〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 15〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 16〉
Table 2: A possible natural language reading of the dialogue in Table 1.
a1: The boy is innocent.
a2: The boy is innocent if he is not proven guilty.
a1: We assume the boy is not proven guilty.
a2: Proving that the boy is guilty disagrees with this assumption.
a1: The boy is guilty if witness 1 is believable.
a2: We assume witness 1 is believable.
a1: Showing witness 1 cannot be believed disagrees with this assumption.
a1: Witness 1 cannot be believed if it is contradicted by witness 2.
a1: Witness 1 is indeed contradicted by witness 2.
a2: The boy is guilty if witness 2 is believable.
a1: We assume witness 2 is believable.
a2: Showing witness 2 cannot be believed disagrees with this assumption.
a1: Witness 2 cannot be believed if it has a poor eyesight.
a2: Witness 2 indeed has a poor eyesight.
a1: OK.
a2: OK.
14
boy proven guilty ← w2 is believable,
w1 not believable← w1 contradicted by w2,
w1 contradicted by w2←,
w2 not believable← w2 has poor eyesight,
w2 has poor eyesight←}
• Cδ(boy not proven guilty) = {boy proven guilty},
Cδ(w1 is believable) = {w1 is not believable},
Cδ(w2 is believable) = {w2 is not believable}.
Note that this is an ABA framework.
4. Constructing Dialogues
This section gives the basic notions used in our model to allow agents to con-
struct dialogues. As in other dialogue models, notably that of [33], these notions
amount to turn-making functions, to determine which agent should make an ut-
terance at any point in a dialogue, legal-move functions, to determine which ut-
terances agents can make during dialogues, and outcome functions, to determine
whether dialogues have desirable properties.
In Example 3.2, the two agents take turns in making utterances: a strict in-
terleaving is enforced between these two agents. In general, such requirement is
unnecessary, i.e., an agent may be allowed to make a few consecutive utterances
before the other agent makes any. We define a turn-making function to specify
which agent makes the next utterance in a dialogue.
Definition 4.1. A turn-making function is a mapping γ : D 7→ {a1, a2} such that,
given δ = Daiaj(χ) = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
γ(δ) =
{
ai if n = 0,
ax ∈ {ai, aj} otherwise.
A dialogue 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ( n > 0 ) is compatible with a turn-making function
γ iff for each l = 1, . . . , n, if ul = 〈ax, , , , 〉 then γ(〈u1, . . . , ul−1〉) = ax.
Our definition of turn-making function is very liberal, in that it states that
ai starts Daiaj(χ) and all subsequent utterances are made by any of the agents as
dictated by γ. As observed earlier, γ(δ) for δ = Da1a2(χ) in Example 3.2 forces a
strict interleaving between a1 and a2, whereas the dialogue in Table 3.2 does not.
Definition 4.2. A legal-move function (with respect to a turn-taking function γ) is
a mapping λ : D 7→ 2U such that, given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ D, for all u ∈ λ(δ):
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1. δ ◦ u is a dialogue;
2. δ ◦ u is compatible with γ if δ is;
3. if u = 〈 , , T, C, 〉, then there is no i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that ui = 〈 , , T, C, 〉.
Given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, if um+1 ∈ λ(〈u1, . . . , um〉) for all m such that 0 ≤
m < n, we say that δ is compatible with λ.
Here condition 3 regulates that there is no repeated utterance to the same target
in a dialogue. However, the definition of legal-move function does not impose any
“mentalistic” requirement on agents, such as that they utter information they hold
true, similarly to communication protocols in multi-agent systems [44].
Notation 4.1. We use Λ to denote the set of all legal-move functions.
Different types of dialogues will require a different turn-making functions. For
example, negotiation typically requires a strict interleaving, whereas inquiry does
not (although strict interleaving may be used for inquiry too, as in [6]). As our
dialogue framework is generic, from now on we will assume as given a generic
turn-making function γ and we will omit to mention it in definitions, assuming
implicitly that all our dialogues are compatible with this γ. In particular, we will
omit the turn-making function when giving legal-move functions.
We conclude this section by defining outcome functions, to determine whether
dialogues have desirable properties.
Definition 4.3. An outcome function is a mapping ω : D × Λ 7→ {true, false}.
Notation 4.2. We use Ω to denote the set of all outcome functions.
In the remainder we give several concrete legal-move and outcome functions.
5. ABA Dialogues
In this section, we refine our dialogues so that the frameworks drawn from
them are guaranteed to be flat ABA frameworks. The resulting dialogues are
referred to as ABA dialogues. This refinement builds upon specific kinds of legal-
move function and outcome function to restrict the kind of allowed utterances.
As mentioned earlier, in general, the framework drawn from a dialogue may
not be an ABA framework, since the contrary of some assumption may be empty:
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Example 5.1. Given L = {s, a}, let δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(a), 3〉
The framework drawn from this dialogue, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, has:
• Aδ = {a};
• Rδ = {s← a};
• Cδ(a) = {}.
Fδ, is not an ABA framework as the contrary of a in this framework is empty.
Even when the framework drawn from a dialogue is an ABA framework, it
may not be flat, as the agents may disagree on the assumptions:
Example 5.2. Given L = {s, a, q, r}, let δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 2, rl(a← q), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 3, ctr(a, r), 5〉
The framework Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 has:
• Aδ = {a};
• Rδ = {s← a, a← q};
• Cδ(a) = {r}.
Here a is both an assumption and the head of a rule, hence Fδ is not flat.
We ensure flatness of the framework drawn from a dialogue using a specific
kind of legal-move function, as follows.
Definition 5.1. A flat legal-move function is a legal-move function λ ∈ Λ such
that, given a dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ D, for all u = 〈 , , , C, 〉 ∈ λ(δ), then
• C = asm(α) only if there exists no ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with content rl(ρ) and
Head(ρ) = α;
• C = rl(ρ) only if there exists no ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with content asm(α) and
Head(ρ) = α.
δ in Example 5.2 is not compatible with a flat legal-move function.
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Lemma 5.1. Given a dialogue δ ∈ D, if δ is compatible with a flat legal-move
function and the framework Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 drawn from δ is an ABA frame-
work, then Fδ is a flat ABA framework.
The proof of this and all results in this article can be found in Appendix B.
In order to guarantee that the framework drawn from a dialogue is an ABA
framework, we will use a specific kind of outcome function imposing that each
assumption has a non-empty set as its contrary:
Definition 5.2. The ABA outcome function ωABA is such that given a dialogue
δ ∈ D and a legal-move function λ ∈ Λ, ωABA(δ, λ) = true iff δ is compatible
with λ and the framework 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 drawn from δ is such that for all α ∈
Aδ, Cδ(α) 6= {}. A λ-ABA dialogue is a dialogue δ ∈ D with λ ∈ Λ flat such that
ωABA(δ, λ) = true. An ABA dialogue is a λ-ABA dialogue for some λ ∈ Λ.
Lemma 5.2. The framework drawn from an ABA dialogue is a flat ABA frame-
work.
In the remainder, all dialogues will be λ-ABA dialogues, for some (flat) λ.
In the remainder of the paper we will impose further restrictions on λ to obtain
specialised forms of dialogues. First, however, let us give a concrete example of
ABA dialogue.
5.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
The dialogue δ in Table 1 is an ABA dialogue. Indeed, it is compatible with a
flat legal-move function λfl since there is no β such that both asm(β) and rl(β ←
. . .) are contents of utterances in δ. As a result, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 is a (flat)
ABA framework and indeed ωABA(δ, λfl) = true, since for all assumptions
α ∈ Aδ = {boy not proven guilty, w1 is believable, w2 is believable}
the contrary of α is not empty.
6. Successful Dialogues
The definitions so far jointly establish the foundations of a generic dialogue
framework for determining acceptability of claims (in the flat ABA framework
drawn from ABA dialogues). In this section, we define three notions of successful
dialogues, intuitively amounting to sanctioning the initial claims as acceptable
according to the admissible, grounded and ideal semantics, respectively.
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Definition 6.1. Given a dialogueDaiaj(χ)= δ, letFδ be the ABA framework drawn
from δ. Then δ is:
• a-successful iff χ is admissible in Fδ;
• g-successful iff χ is grounded in Fδ;
• i-successful iff χ is ideal in Fδ.
These notions equate success of a dialogue with determining whether its claim
is semantically acceptable, according to the three semantics we focus on, in the
ABA framework drawn form the dialogue. Thus, successful dialogues can be
seen as a distributed mechanism for determining acceptability while also building
a shared knowledge base (the ABA framework) to determine acceptability. As
discussed earlier, this shared knowledge base may or may not reflect the agents’
individual knowledge bases, depending on whether they are truthful or not.
Proposition 6.1. Given a dialogue δ ∈ D, if δ is g-successful, then δ is also
a-successful and i-successful.
Proposition 6.2. Given a dialogue δ ∈ D, if δ is i-successful, then δ is a-successful.
Example 6.1. Let the dialogue δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, c), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(c), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(c, a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
The ABA framework, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, drawn from this dialogue has:
• Aδ = {a, c};
• Rδ = {};
• Cδ(a) = {c}, Cδ(c) = {a}.
Here, argument {a} ` a attacks argument {c} ` c and vice versa. Then {a} ` a
defends itself and, hence, it is admissible. Thus a is admissible. Since {c} ` c
is also admissible, a is not grounded nor ideal. Since a is admissible, but not
grounded, nor ideal, in Fδ, δ is a-successful, but not g- or i-successful.
Example 6.2. Let the dialogue δ be:
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a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, c), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(c), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(c, b), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(b←), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
The ABA framework, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, drawn from this dialogue has:
• Aδ = {a, c};
• Rδ = {b←};
• Cδ(a) = {c}, Cδ(c) = {b}.
Here, we have arguments {a} ` a, {c} ` c and {} ` b. {c} ` c attacks {a} ` a
and {} ` b defends {a} ` a by attacking {c} ` c. No argument attacks {} ` b.
Hence, a is admissible, grounded and ideal in Fδ, and consequently δ is a-, g- and
i-successful.
Example 6.3. Let the dialogue δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(b← c, d), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, asm(c), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, asm(d), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 5, ctr(c, a), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 6, ctr(d, c), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, asm(c), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 7, asm(a), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 10, ctr(a, b), 11〉 〈a2, a1, 9, ctr(c, a), 12〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 13〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 14〉
The ABA framework drawn from this dialogue, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, has:
• Aδ = {a, c, d};
• Rδ = {b← c, d};
• Cδ(a) = {b}, Cδ(c) = {a}, Cδ(d) = {c}.
The set of assumptions {a, d} is the only preferred set, {a} is admissible and ideal,
and {} is grounded. Thus, a is ideal (and admissible), but not grounded, in Fδ.
Hence, the dialogue δ is i-successful (and a-successful) but not g-successful.
Note that we could define a notion of p-successful dialogue, with preferred
claim in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue. Since every admissible
set (of assumptions/arguments) is necessarily contained in a preferred set (see [11,
7]), and every preferred set is admissible by definition, trivially a dialogue is p-
successful iff it is a-successful. Similarly, we could define a notion of c-successful
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dialogue, with claim in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue. However,
since every preferred set is complete (see [11, 7]) and thus every admissible set is
contained in a complete set, trivially a dialogue is c-successful iff it is a-successful.
Therefore, we can focus on g-, a- and i-successful dialogues.
6.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
The claim, boy innocent, of the dialogue in Table 1 is supported by:
A = {boy not proven guilty} ` boy innocent,
attacked by:
B = {w1 is believable} ` boy proven guilty and
C = {w2 is believable} ` boy proven guilty.
B and C are in turn attacked by:
D = {} ` w1 is not believable and E = {} ` w2 is not believable,
respectively. Since D and E are supported by the empty set, they cannot be
attacked. Hence, boy innocent is admissible, grounded, and ideal in Fδ, and this
dialogue is a-, g- and i-successful.
In this section we have given non-constructive notions of successful dialogues,
sanctioning the acceptability of their claims. In the remainder of the paper we
show how successful dialogues can be constructed by deploying appropriate legal-
move and outcome functions.
7. Related and Exhaustive Dialogues
In this section, we refine ABA dialogues, by using a specialised class of legal-
move functions to avoid “disconnected” dialogues, and by using a new outcome
function to avoid “incomplete” dialogues. The resulting refined ABA dialogues
bring us closer to constructing successful dialogues.
The following is an example of “disconnected” dialogue:
Example 7.1. Consider dialogue δ:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(p← q), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, asm(a), 3〉
Here, there is no connection between contents of utterances and their targets, e.g.,
there is no connection between the rule p ← q and the sentence s, and between
the assumption a and the sentence s. The dialogue is not a-successful (and thus
not g- and i-successful) as indeed s is not even supported by an argument in Fδ.
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Note that the second and third utterances in the dialogue in Example 7.1 are
connected to their target in the sense of the following definition of related-ness:
Definition 7.1. For any two utterances ui, uj ∈ U , ui 6= uj , uj is related to ui iff
ui = 〈 , , , , ID〉, uj = 〈 , , ID, , 〉.
Indeed, condition 4 in Definition 3.2 enforces that all regular utterances in a
dialogue are related according to this basic, syntactic notion. The following is a
more purposeful notion of related-ness:
Definition 7.2. For any two utterances ui, uj ∈ U , ui = 〈 , , , Ci, 〉, uj =〈 , , ,
Cj, 〉, uj is top-down related to ui iff uj is related to ui (as in Definition 7.1) and
one of the following cases holds:
1. Cj = rl(ρj), Head(ρj) = β and either Ci = rl(ρi) with β ∈ Body(ρi), or
Ci = ctr( , β), or Ci = claim(β);
2. Cj = asm(α) and either Ci = rl(ρ) with α ∈ Body(ρ), or Ci = ctr( , α), or
Ci = claim(α);
3. Cj = ctr(α, ) and Ci = asm(α).
Intuitively, an utterance is top-down related to another if it contributes to ex-
panding an argument (case 1), identifies an assumption in the support of an argu-
ment (case 2) or starts the construction of a counter-argument (case 3). Note that
an utterance may be top-down related to an utterance from the same agent or not.
Also, no pass utterance can be top-down related to an utterance and vice versa.
We use the notion of top-down related-ness to define a new class of legal-move
functions and corresponding connected dialogues:
Definition 7.3. A top-down related legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is such that for
δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, δ ∈ D, and for all u ∈ λ(δ) such that u is a regular utterance,
then u is top-down related to some um in δ (1 ≤ m ≤ n). A top-down related
dialogue is a λ-ABA dialogue for a top-down related λ ∈ Λ.
For simplicity, in the remainder, we use “related” to mean “top-down related”.
The dialogue in Example 3.2 is related; the dialogue in Example 7.1 is not. Note
that a dialogue can be compatible with a legal-move function that fulfils several
purposes, e.g., being flat and related, as is the case in Example 3.2. In the remain-
der, all dialogues will be related.
The following is an example of an “incomplete” dialogue:
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Example 7.2. The following dialogue δ:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(a← c), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(c←), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(b← c), 5〉
is “incomplete”, as 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(c←), 6〉 can be uttered as rl(c←) is in Fδ (since
it is the content of utterance with identifier 4).
The next notion we introduce prevents this form of “incompleteness” and gives
a sense of exhaustiveness. Exhaustiveness is introduced to ensure a dialogue is
“complete” in the sense that there are no “unsaid” utterances in such dialogues
that would explicitly bring about important arguments for determining success.
This feature will ease the proof of soundness results later.
Definition 7.4. The exhaustive outcome function ωex is such that, given δ ∈ D
and λ ∈ Λ, ωex(δ, λ) = true iff ωABA(δ, λ) = true and, given 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 the
ABA framework drawn from δ, there exists no u′ ∈ λ(δ) with content either:
• asm(α), for α ∈ Aδ, or
• rl(ρ), for ρ ∈ Rδ, or
• ctr(α, β), for β ∈ Cδ(α),
such that ωABA(δ ◦ u′, λ) = true.
A λ-exhaustive dialogue is a λ-ABA dialogue δ such that ωex(δ, λ) = true and
λ is related. An exhaustive dialogue is a λ-exhaustive dialogue for some λ ∈ Λ.
Note that exhaustiveness does not force agents to contribute to dialogues all
relevant information they hold. Rather, it enforces that if an utterance u with
content equal to an assumption, a rule or contrary has been made compatibly with
a certain λ, then another utterance u′ with the same content as u should be made
in δ, if such u′ is allowed by λ. The dialogue in Example 7.2 is not exhaustive,
whereas the dialogue in Example 3.2 is.
7.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
The dialogue δ shown in Table 1 is related and λ-exhaustive, for λ related.
Indeed, in addition to being an ABA dialogue (as we have seen in Section 5.1),
δ is compatible with a (top-down) related legal-move function λ as all regular
utterances are related; and it is λ-exhaustive as there is no utterance u′ related
to any existing utterance with content an assumption, rule or contrary already in
Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 (see Section 5.1) that can be added to δ.
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8. Debate Trees
In this section we define debate trees to keep track of information that has been
disclosed in dialogues. These are then used to define new legal-move functions
and outcome functions guaranteeing the construction of successful dialogues (see
later in Section 10). The new legal-move functions allow to decide utterances
on the basis of debate trees drawn from dialogues. The new outcome functions
determine the outcome of dialogues on the basis of conditions satisfied by the
corresponding debate trees. Informally (see Definition 8.1 below for the formal
definition), each node of debate trees
1. contains one sentence,
2. is tagged as either unmarked (um), marked-rule (mr) or marked-assumption
(ma),
3. is labelled either proponent (P) or opponent (O) as in the abstract dispute
trees of [14], and
4. has an ID taken from an utterance in the dialogue.
Intutively, the sentence of each node in a debate tree represents an argument’s
claim or element of the argument’s support. A node is tagged unmarked if its
sentence is only mentioned in the claim or the body of a rule or contrary of an
assumption, but without any further examination, marked-rule if its sentence is the
head of an uttered rule, and marked-assumption if its sentence has been explicitly
uttered as an assumption. A node is labelled P (O) if it is (directly or indirectly)
for (against, respectively) the claim of the dialogue. The ID is used to identify the
node’s corresponding utterance in the dialogue.
As an illustration, possible nodes from utterances in Example 3.2 are:
(s, um : P[1]), (s,mr : P[1]),
(a, um : P[3]), (a,ma : P[4]),
(q, um : O[5]).
Note that, since debate trees can be viewed as constructed in steps as dialogues
proceed, not all nodes in the above list are in a debate tree at every step. Namely,
certain nodes tagged as um, such as (s, um : P[1]) and (q, um : O[5]) are replaced
by nodes with “updated” information about the same sentences, i.e., (s,mr : P[1])
and (q,mr : O[5]), respectively, after new utterances are inserted into the dia-
logue. For instance, the content of utterance 5 in the dialogue in Example 3.2 is
ctr(a, q), so when this utterance occurs, q is only mentioned as a contrary of a,
it is uncertain whether q is an assumption or the head of a rule, hence the tag in
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(s,mr : P[1]) s (a,ma : P[4])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
a
OO
(q, um : O[5])
OO
Figure 3: Nodes in a debate tree connected as in arguments (left) or attacks between them (right).
(q, um : O[5]) is um. However, after utterance 6, which has content rl(q ← b), it
is known that q is the head of the rule q ← b, hence (q, um : O[5]) is replaced by
(q,mr : O[5]). Thus nodes tagged um may be replaced by other nodes during the
construction of a debate tree. Also, when “updating” a node, its ID is not always
changed, as seen in the example, where (s, um : P[1]) and (s,mr : P[1]) have the
same ID (1). This is because that ID is used for book keeping purposes to decide
where to insert new nodes. The rules for updating IDs are given later.
In a debate tree, nodes are connected in two cases:
1. they belong to the same argument, and
2. they form attacks between two arguments.
Figure 3 (left) gives an example of the first case, for the dialogue in Example 3.2.
Here, we see the connected nodes in a debate tree on the far left and, next to
them, the corresponding argument (represented as a tree). In the second case, two
nodes N1 = (α,ma : L[id]) and N2 = (β, : L′[ ]), L,L′ ∈ {P, O}, L′ 6= L,
are connected if there is an utterance u = 〈 , , id, ctr(α, β), 〉 in the dialogue
(e.g., see Figure 3, right). Hence, the two nodes are connected if the parent node
contains an assumption and the child node contains a contrary of that assumption.
We give the formal definition of a debate tree as follows.
Definition 8.1. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ, the debate tree drawn from δ is a
tree T (δ), where:
1. nodes of T (δ) can be characterised as follows:
(a) nodes are tuples (S, F : L[U ]) where
• S is a sentence in L,
• F (the tag) is either um (unmarked), mr (marked-rule) or ma
(marked-assumption),
• L (the label) is either P (proponent) or O (opponent),
• U ∈ ID (the ID);
(b) (β, : [ ]) is a node in T (δ) iff there is an utterance 〈 , , , C, 〉 in δ
such that C is either:
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i. claim(β), or
ii. rl(s0 ← s1, . . . , sm) where β = si for some i, 0 < i ≤ m, or
iii. asm(β), or
iv. ctr( , β);
(c) (β, um : [t]) is a node in T (δ) iff there is no utterance
〈 , , t, rl(β ← . . .), 〉 or 〈 , , t, asm(β), 〉 in δ;
2. edges of T (δ) are of 6 types (below L,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6= L′):
(a) for N = (s0,mr : L[t]) and N ′ = (si, um : L[id]), N is the parent of
N ′ iff there is one utterance in δ of the form
〈 , , t, rl(s0 ← . . . , si, . . .), id〉
and there is no utterance in δ of the forms
〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉 or 〈 , , id, asm(si), 〉;
(b) for N = (s0,mr : L[t]) and N ′ = (si,mr : L[id]), N is the parent of
N ′ iff there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, rl(s0 ← . . . , si, . . .), id〉 and 〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉, respectively;
(c) for N = (s0,mr : L[t]) and N ′ = (si,ma : L[id]), N is the parent of
N ′ iff there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, rl(s0 ← . . . , si, . . .), t′〉 and 〈 , , t′, asm(si), id〉, respectively;
(d) for N = (s0,ma : L[t]) and N ′ = (si, um : L′[id]), N is the parent
of N ′ iff there is one utterance in δ of the form 〈 , , t, ctr(s0, si), id〉,
and there is no utterance in δ of the forms
〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉 or 〈 , , id, asm(si), 〉;
(e) for N = (s0,ma : L[t]) and N ′ = (si,mr : L′[id]), N is the parent of
N ′ iff there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, ctr(s0, si), id〉 and 〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉, respectively;
(f) for N = (s0,ma : L[t]) and N ′ = (si,ma : L′[id]), N is the parent of
N ′ iff there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, ctr(s0, si), t′〉 and 〈 , , t′, asm(si), id〉, respectively.
We say that a dialogue δ draws the debate tree T (δ).
Notation 8.1. For convenience, we call ( ,mr : [ ]), ( ,ma : [ ]), and ( , um :
[ ]), a rule, assumption, and unmarked node, respectively.
The debate tree T (δ) for δ in Example 3.2 is shown in Figure 4.
Definition 8.1 gives the characteristics of debate trees. Debate trees are con-
structed as dialogues progress. The construction of debate trees is given below.
26
(s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(r, um : O[10])
OO
Figure 4: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 3.2.
Lemma 8.1. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ, the debate tree T (δ) is T m(δ) in
the sequence T 0(δ), T 1(δ), . . . , T m(δ) constructed inductively from the pi-pruned
sequence δ′ = 〈u′1 . . . , u′m〉 obtained from δ, as follows (L,L′ ∈ {P, O}, L 6= L′):
1. T 0(δ) is empty;
2. T 1(δ) contains a single node:
(χ, um : P[id1]),
where id1 is the identifier of u′1 = u1;
3. let T i(δ) be the i-th tree, 0<i<m, let u′i+1 = 〈 , , t, C, id〉 and 〈 , , , Ct, t〉
be the target utterance of u′i+1; then T i+1(δ) is obtained as follows:
(a) if C=rl(β0←β1,. . . ,βl) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with additional nodes:
(β1, um : L[id]), . . . , (βl, um : L[id])
as children of the node (β0, : L[t]), and the node (β0, : L[t]) is
replaced by (β0,mr : L[t]);
(b) if C = asm(α) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with the node (α, um : L[t])
replaced by (α,ma : L[id]);
(c) ifC = ctr(α, β) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with an additional node: (β, um :
L[id]) child of (α,ma : L′[t]).
The construction of the debate tree in Figure 4 is shown in Figure 5.
Arguments can be drawn from a debate tree, as follows:
Definition 8.2. An argument drawn from a debate tree T (δ) is a sub-tree T of
T (δ) such that:
1. all nodes in T have the same label (either P or O);
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T 1(δ) T 2(δ) T 3(δ) T 4(δ) T 5(δ)
(s, um : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(a, um : P[3])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(q, um : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(b, um : O[6])
OO
T 6(δ) T 7(δ) T 8(δ) T 9(δ)
(s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(c, um : P[8])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(r, um : O[10])
OO
Figure 5: Construction of the debate tree in Figure 4 (using utterances u′1, . . . , u
′
9 in Example 3.3).
2. if there is an utterance 〈 , , , rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βm), t〉 in δ and (β0,mr :
L[t]) is in T , then (β1, : L[ ]), . . . , (βm, : L[ ]) are in T ;
3. there does not exist a node N ′ in T (δ) such that N ′ is parent or child of
some node Ni in T , N ′ is not in T and Ni, N ′ have the same label.
The sentence χ in the root of an argument T drawn from a debate tree is the
claim of T . An argument T drawn from a debate tree is actual if for all nodes
( , F : [ ]) in T , F is either mr or ma; if there is at least one node of the form
( , um : [ ]) in T , then T is potential. An argument drawn from a debate tree is
a proponent (opponent) argument if its nodes are labelled P (O, respectively).
Example 8.1. Given the debate tree in Figure 4, we can draw three actual argu-
ments and one potential argument, as shown in Figure 6.
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(s,mr : P[1]) (q,mr : O[5]) (c,ma : P[9]) (r, um : O[10])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
Figure 6: The actual arguments (the first three starting from left) and potential argument (right
most) drawn from the debate tree in Figure 4.
Note that, in debate trees, as in abstract dispute trees [14], proponent/opponent
are roles/fictitious players rather than actual agents and agents can play separate or
both such roles in a dialogue. For example, in the case of inquiry dialogues [43],
agents may want to play both roles interchangeably, whereas in persuasion dia-
logues [43] the agent putting forward the claim may play solely the role of propo-
nent and the other agent the role of opponent.
Notation 8.2. We refer to an actual or potential argument drawn from a debate
tree simply as actual or potential argument (respectively).
We refer to arguments in ABA (see Section 2) as ABA arguments, to distin-
guish them from arguments drawn from debate trees.
Given a debate tree T (δ), we say that a node is in an argument (in T (δ)) iff it
is a node in some argument drawn from T (δ).
If T is a potential argument and χ is its claim, T is written as Sa, Sr `t χ,
where Sa = {α|(α,ma : [ ]) is a node in T } and Sr = {β|(β, um : [ ]) is a
node in T }. If T is an actual argument and χ is its claim, T is written as S `t χ,
where S = {α|(α,ma : [ ]) is a node in T }.
Definition 8.2 gives a means of talking about arguments in the context of de-
bate trees. The following lemma sanctions that actual arguments can be mapped
to equivalent ABA arguments.
Lemma 8.2. Given a dialogue δ ∈ D, for each actual argument S `t β drawn
from the debate tree T (δ), there exists an ABA argument S ` β in the ABA
framework drawn from δ.
The ABA arguments corresponding to actual arguments drawn from the debate
tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 3.2 (see Figures 4, 6) are {a} ` s,
{b} ` q, and {c} ` c.
For exhaustive dialogues, the other direction of Lemma 8.2 holds as well:
Lemma 8.3. Given an exhaustive dialogue δ ∈ D, for each ABA argument S ` β
in the ABA framework drawn from δ, S `t β can be drawn from T (δ).
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Lemma 8.3 does not hold if a dialogue is not exhaustive, as shown next.
Example 8.2. Let a dialogue δ ∈ D be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(a← b, c), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(b←), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 2, rl(c← b), 4〉
The ABA framework Fδ drawn from δ has:
• Rδ = {a← b, c, b←, c← b},
• Aδ = {}.
Clearly, {} ` a is an argument in Fδ. The debate tree T (δ) drawn from δ is in
Figure 7. We can see that no actual argument can be drawn from this tree, as one
leaf node, (b, um : P[4]), of this debate tree is an unmarked node.
(a,mr : P[1])
(b,mr : P[2])
44
(c,mr : P[2])
jj
(b, um : P[4])
OO
Figure 7: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 8.2.
As in [14], we introduce the defence set and the culprits of a debate tree. We
use these two concepts for our soundness result in the next sections.
Definition 8.3. Given a debate tree T (δ),
• the defence set DEF(T (δ)) is the union of all assumptions α in proponent
nodes of the formN = (α,ma : P[ ]), such thatN is in an actual argument;
• the culprits CUL(T (δ)) is the set of all assumptions α in opponent nodes
N = (α,ma : O[ ]) such that the child of N in T (δ) is N ′ = ( , : P[ ])
and both N and N ′ are in actual arguments.
8.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
The debate tree drawn from the dialogue δ shown in Figure 1 is T (δ) shown in
Figure 8. Here, the defence set containing the only assumption in proponent nodes
is {boy not proven guilty} and the culprits set containing the two assumptions
in opponent nodes is {w1 is believable, w2 is believable}.
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(boy innocent,mr : P[1])
(boy not proven guilty,ma : P[3])
OO
(boy proven guilty, um : O[4])
OO
(w1 is believable,ma : O[6])
OO
(w2 is believable,ma : O[11])
mm
(w1 not believable,mr : P[7])
OO
(w2 not believable,mr : P[12])
OO
(w1 contradicted by w2,mr : P[8])
OO
(w2 has poor eyesight,mr : P[13])
OO
Figure 8: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Table 1.
9. Legal-Move and Outcome Functions from Debate Trees
In this section we use debate trees to provide new, refined legal-move and out-
come functions. The definition thereof requires agents to consult the current de-
bate tree before making utterances or deciding whether the dialogue has achieved
the desired outcome. In particular, when an agent decides what to utter, it needs
to take the current debate tree into account and make sure that its new utterance
will keep the tree fulfilling desired properties. Thus, the debate tree drawn from a
dialogue can be seen as a commitment store [43] holding information that agents
disclose and share using the dialogue.
The new notions of legal-move and outcome functions will then be used, in
Sections 10 and 11, to generate provably successful dialogues, in the sense of
Section 6. Note that the first such notion (of patient legal-move function, see
Section 9.1) is not necessary to guarantee successful dialogues, but it is intuitive
and considerably simplifies the proof of results.
9.1. Patient Legal-Move Functions
During dialogues, agents may in general choose to start attacking arguments
while these arguments are still under construction. In patient dialogues, defined
below, this is not allowed, as, in this type of dialogues, arguments are fully ex-
panded (cf. actual) before being attacked.
Definition 9.1. A debate tree T (δ) is patient iff for all nodesN = ( ,ma : [ ]) in
T (δ) such that N has a child, then N is in an actual argument drawn from T (δ).
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A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is patient iff for every δ ∈ D such that T (δ) is
patient, for every u ∈ λ(δ), T (δ ◦ u) is still patient.
The debate tree in Figure 4 is patient, whereas the one in the following exam-
ple is not.
Example 9.1. Let dialogue δ be as follows:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(a, c), 4〉
T (δ), given in Figure 9, is not patient as the argument {a}, {b} `t s is not actual,
since its node (b, um : P[2]) has the tag um, yet the assumption node (a,ma :
P[3]) already has a child (c, um : O[4]).
(s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[3])
44
(b, um : P[2])
jj
(c, um : O[4])
OO
Figure 9: The non-patient debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 9.1.
In the remainder, dialogues are compatible with a patient legal-move function.
9.2. Last-Word Outcome Function and Defensive Dialogues
We refine the notion of exhaustive outcome function guaranteeing that the
(fictitious) proponent has the last-word in the dialogue, namely all leaves in the
debate tree are proponent nodes or “dead-end” opponent nodes (not corresponding
to any un-attacked actual arguments). We first define the notion of a node being
properly attacked in a debate tree:
Definition 9.2. Given a debate tree T (δ), a nodeN in T (δ) is properly attacked iff
N is of the form ( ,ma : [ ]) and N has a child N ′ that is in an actual argument.
Thus, a node is properly attacked iff it is an assumption node and there is
an actual argument attacking the assumption in the node. Intuitively, this notion
allows to distinguish assumptions against which actual attacks have been con-
structed (and thus ‘properly attacked’) from assumptions currently under attack
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but for which no actual attack has yet been finalised. In what we call ‘last-word’
dialogues, the debate tree is such that all its opponent arguments have an assump-
tion node which is properly attacked:
Definition 9.3. A debate tree T (δ) is last-word iff
1. for all leaf nodes N in T (δ), N is either ( ,mr : P[ ]) or ( ,ma : P[ ]), and
2. if a leaf node N is of the form ( , : O[ ]), then either
(a) N is in a potential argument, or
(b) N is in an actual argument that contains one node N ′ of the form
(α,ma : O[ ]) such that there is another node N ′′ in T (δ) of the form
(α,ma : O[ ]), N ′′ 6= N , and N ′′ is properly attacked.
The last-word outcome function ωlw is such that, given δ ∈ D and λ ∈ Λ,
ωlw(δ, λ) = true iff ωex(δ, λ) = true and T (δ) is last-word.
A λ-defensive dialogue is a λ-exhaustive dialogue δ ∈ D such that ωlw(δ, λ) =
true. A defensive dialogue is a λ-defensive dialogue for some λ ∈ Λ.
Intuitively, the last-word outcome function specifies a winning condition for
the (fictitious) proponent: either the proponent finishes the dialogue with rules and
un-attacked assumptions (condition 1), or the (fictitious) opponent does not pose
any valid attacks via actual argument (condition 2a), or any valid attacks posed by
the opponent has been answered with valid counter attacks (condition 2b).
The dialogue in Example 3.2 is defensive, as the debate tree in Figure 4 shows.
The next example shows a dialogue that is not.
Example 9.2. The following dialogue δ
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 3〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 4〉
is not defensive. Indeed, the debate tree T (δ) (see Figure 10) is not last-word, as
there are two unmarked leaf node in T (δ): (a, um : P[2]) and (b, um : P[2]).
9.3. Conflict-Free Outcome Function and Conflict-Free Dialogues
As in the case of abstract dispute trees, the defence set of a debate tree may
attack itself. We refine the notion of outcome function to avoid this, as follows:
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(s,mr : P[1])
(a, um : P[2])
44
(b, um : P[2])
jj
Figure 10: A non-defensive dialogue in Example 9.2.
Definition 9.4. The conflict-free outcome function ωcf is such that, given δ ∈
D and a legal-move function λ, ωcf (δ, λ) = true iff ωlw(δ, λ) = true and
DEF(T (δ)) ∩ CUL(T (δ)) = {}.
A λ-conflict-free dialogue is a λ-defensive dialogue δ ∈ D such that ωcf (δ, λ) =
true. A conflict-free dialogue is a λ-conflict-free dialogue for some λ ∈ Λ.
Lemma 9.1. Let δ be a conflict-free dialogue and let Fδ be the ABA framework
drawn from δ. Then, DEF(T (δ)) does not attack itself in Fδ.
9.4. Filtered Legal-Move Functions
Another legal-move function that relies on the debate tree as a commitment
store is the filtered legal-move function, defined in terms of filtered debate trees.
These are trees where the same assumptions are not attacked repeatedly, unneces-
sarily. Instead, in a filtered debate tree, if an assumption has already been marked,
then it does not need to be“dealt with” again. Formally:
Definition 9.5. A debate tree T (δ) is filtered iff for any two nodes T (δ): N1 =
(β,ma : L[id1]), N2 = (β,ma : L[id2]), L ∈ {P,O}, N1 6= N2, if N1 has a child
N ′1 in an actual argument T1 and N2 has a child N ′2 in an actual argument T2, then
T1 6= T2.8 A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is filtered iff for every δ ∈ D such that
T (δ) is filtered, for every u ∈ λ(δ), T (δ ◦ u) is still filtered.
Example 9.3. The following dialogue (from which the debate tree in Figure 11
(left) is drawn) is compatible with a filtered legal-move function:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(b), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(b, a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
8Note that, when comparing two arguments for equality, we only consider the sentence and the
tag in each argument, while ignoring the label and the ID.
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(a,ma : P[2]) (a,ma : P[2])
(b,ma : O[4])
OO
(b,ma : O[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(b, um : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[8])
OO
Figure 11: Filtered (left) and non-filtered (right) debate trees for Example 9.3.
Here the argument {a} ` a is attacked by {b} ` b once and only once, and,
in the filtered debate tree (Figure 11 left), since the node (a,ma : P[2]) has a child
(b,ma : O[4]), the node (a,ma : P[6]) cannot be attacked by the same argument
{b} ` b, hence (b, um : O[7]) is an unmarked node, rather than a marked assump-
tion node. Instead, the dialogue below
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(b), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(b, a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, asm(b), 8〉
(from which the debate tree in Figure 11 (right) is drawn) is not compatible with
a filtered legal-move function. Here, the argument {a} ` a is attacked by {b} ` b
twice.
Thus, filtered legal-move functions bring efficiency to dialogues, as, in dia-
logues that are compatible with a filtered legal-move function, any assumption is
attacked at most once by the same argument.
9.5. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
The debate tree T (δ) given in Figure 8 is patient and filtered. Hence, δ in
Table 1 is compatible with a patient and filtered (as well as flat and related) legal-
move function λ. The two leaf nodes in Figure 8 are:
(w1 contradicted by w2,mr : P[8]) and (w2 has poor eyesight,mr : P[13]),
both are proponent nodes with marked rules, hence of the form ( ,mr : P[ ]). By
Definition 9.3, T (δ) is last-word and ωlw(δ, λ) = true. Moreover,DEF(T (δ)) =
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{boy not proven guilty} and CUL(T (δ)) = {w1 is believable, w2 is believable}.
Thus, by Definition 9.4, ωcf (δ, λ) = true and δ is λ-conflict-free.
Overall, in this section we have introduced the basic ingredients to formally
link dialogues with argumentation semantics and show how successful dialogues
can be constructed. In the next sections, we will do so for different categories of
dialogues, that vary in how broadly or narrowly they debate the given claim.
10. Focused Dialogues
In this section we link dialogues and argumentation semantics for dialogues
that focus on constructing a single abstract dispute tree for the claim, where the
(fictitious) proponent only needs to build single (supporting and defending) argu-
ments, whereas the (fictitious) opponent may build several (attacking) arguments.
Definition 10.1. A debate tree T (δ) is focused iff
1. for all arguments A drawn from T (δ), if A contains a node ( ,ma : O[ ]),
then there is at most one node N of the form ( ,ma : O[ ]) in A such that N
has any child, and such node N has a single child;
2. for all nodes of the form (β0,mr : P[t]) with children (β1, : P[ ]), . . .,
(βn, : P[ ]) there must be an utterance in δ of the form
〈 , , t, rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βn), 〉.
A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is focused iff for every δ ∈ D such that T (δ)
is focused, for every u ∈ λ(δ), T (δ ◦ u) is still focused. A focused dialogue is a
dialogue compatible with a focused legal-move function.
In focused trees, no alternative ways to support or defend the claim are con-
sidered simultaneously, e.g. an opponent argument is only attacked by a single
proponent argument, whereas a proponent argument can be attacked in as many
ways as the number of its assumptions and ways to prove their contraries. More-
over, the claim is supported by a single proponent argument. The tree in Figure 4
is focused. Figures 12 and 13 show two non-focused debate trees drawn from the
dialogues in Tables 3 and 4, respectively, and violating condition 1 and 2 in Def-
inition 10.1, respectively. In these (unfocused) dialogues the agents stick to the
original claim but they shift the way they carry out the debate. For example, in
the dialogue in Table 3 two different ways to defeat an opponent argument are ex-
plored concurrently (by building arguments against a and b), although one suffices
to determine acceptability of the claim.
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Table 3: A dialogue that draws a non-focused debate tree.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(χ), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(χ), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(χ, s), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(s← a, b), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, asm(a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, asm(b), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 5, ctr(a, c), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 6, ctr(b, c), 8〉
Table 4: Another dialogue that draws a non-focused debate tree.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← b), 3〉
λ-defensive dialogues for λ focused give debate trees corresponding to ab-
stract dispute trees [14] with the same defence set and culprits. Formally:
Lemma 10.1. Given a λ-defensive dialogue δ ∈ D for χ, for λ-focused, let T (δ)
be the debate tree drawn from δ and Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 be the ABA framework
drawn from δ. Then there is an abstract dispute tree T a for S ` χ for some
S ⊆ Aδ, such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a).
Lemma 10.1 shows the connection between the debate trees drawn from λ-
defensive for λ-related and focused dialogues and abstract dispute trees. An anal-
ogous result can be obtained for λ-defensive and filtered dialogues. Indeed, since
filtered legal-move functions perform a form of “filtering” resulting in pruned
trees, the result relies upon inserting nodes that have been filtered back into the
debate tree, resulting in expanded debate trees, defined as follows:
Definition 10.2. Given a debate tree T (δ) where δ is λ-defensive for λ-focused,
we construct a (possibly infinite) sequence T E0 , . . . , T En , . . . of trees as follows:
• Delete all nodesN from T (δ) whereN is in a potential argument. Let T ′(δ)
be the result.
• T E0 = T ′(δ).
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(χ,ma : P[2])
(s,mr : O[3])
OO
(a,ma : O[5])
44
(b,ma : O[6])
jj
(c, um : P[7])
OO
(c, um : P[8])
OO
Figure 12: A non-focused tree (drawn from the dialogue in Table 3). Here, the opponent argument
{a, b} `t s has two proponent nodes as its children: (c, um : P[7]) and (c, um : P[8]).
(s,mr : P[1])
(a, um : P[2])
44
(b, um : P[3])
jj
Figure 13: A non-focused tree (drawn from the dialogue in Table 4). Here, a proponent node (the
root) has two proponent children from two different utterances.
• Suppose T Ei , for i ≥ 0, has been constructed; then T Ei+1 is obtained by
adding arguments T1, . . . , Tk simultaneously to leaf nodes N1, . . . , Nk of
T Ei , as children, respectively, where Tj and Nj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k are such that:
1. Nj is of the form (α,ma : L0[ ]) (L0 ∈ {P,O}),
2. there is N0j of the form (α,ma : [ ]) in T ′(δ), N0j 6= Nj ,
3. N0j has a child N
′
j in T ′(δ), and N ′j is in an actual argument T ′′j in
T ′(δ).
4. modify all nodes (β, F : [id]) in T ′′j to (β, F : P[id]) if L0 = O, or
(β, F : O[id]) if L0 = P; let the result be Tj .
The expanded debate tree T E(δ) of T (δ) is the limit9 of this sequence.
Note that T E(δ) of T (δ) is the last element of this sequence, if the sequence
is finite (when no leaf node is an assumption node).
Example 10.1. We illustrate the notion of expanded debate tree with the debate
tree in Figure 14 for the dialogue in Example 6.3. Here, filtering has been applied
9The limit of a sequence of trees is a (possibly infinite) tree T such that every tree in the
sequence is a top-portion of T , and every finite top-portion of T is a top-portion of some tree in
the sequence. A top-portion of a tree is a subtree that contains the root of the tree.
38
to both: (b, um : O[11]) and (a, um : O[12]). Hence, there is no repeated attack
against these two assumptions. The expanded debate tree is shown in Figure 15.
(a,ma : P[2])
(b,mr : O[3])
OO
(c,ma : O[5])
44
(d,ma : O[6])
jj
(a,ma : P[10])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(b, um : O[11])
OO
(a, um : O[12])
OO
Figure 14: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 6.3.
(a,ma : P[2])
(b,mr : O[3])
OO
(c,ma : O[5])
44
(d,ma : O[6])
jj
(a,ma : P[10])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(b,mr : O[3])
OO
(a,ma : O[10])
OO
(c,ma : O[5])
44
(d,ma : O[6])
OO
(b,mr : P[3])
OO
...
OO
...
OO
(c,ma : P[5])
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(d,ma : P[6])
OO
...
OO
...
OO
Figure 15: The expanded debate tree of the debate tree shown in Figure 14.
Lemma 10.2. Given a λ-defensive dialogue δ for χ, for λ-focused and filtered, let
T (δ) be the debate tree drawn from δ. There is an abstract dispute tree T a for S `
χ for some S, such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a).
In order to guarantee that dialogues are (g-/a-/i-)successful, we restrict them
to be conflict-free (as given in Definition 9.4):
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Theorem 10.1. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ ∈ D, if δ is λ-conflict-free for
λ-focused, then δ is g-successful and χ is grounded in the ABA framework Fδ
drawn from δ (supported by DEF(T (δ))).
Theorem 10.1 gives a “recipe” for generating a- and i-successful dialogues, by
virtue of proposition 6.1. The following Theorems 10.2 and 10.3 characterise a
larger class of dialogues that can be proven to be a- and i-successful, respectively.
Theorem 10.2. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ ∈ D, if δ is λ-conflict-free for
λ-focused and filtered, then δ is a-successful and χ is admissible in the ABA
framework Fδ drawn from δ (supported by DEF(T (δ))).
Definition 10.3. A debate tree T (δ) is ideal iff none of the opponent arguments
drawn from T (δ) belongs to an admissible set of arguments in the ABA frame-
work Fδ drawn from δ.
The ideal outcome function ωi is such that, given δ ∈ D and λ ∈ Λ, ωi(δ, λ) =
true iff ωcf (δ, λ) = true and T (δ) is ideal.
A λ-ideal dialogue is a λ-conflict-free dialogue δ ∈ D such that ωi(δ, λ) =
true. An ideal dialogue is a λ-ideal dialogue for some λ ∈ Λ.
Theorem 10.3. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ ∈ D, if δ is λ-ideal for λ-focused
and filtered, then δ is i-successful and χ is ideal in the ABA framework Fδ drawn
from δ (supported by DEF(T (δ))).
10.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
The debate tree T (δ) given in Figure 8 is focused. Hence, δ in Table 1 is fo-
cused. Then, by Theorems 10.2, 10.1 and Proposition 6.1, δ is a-/g-/i-successful,
as we noted in Section 6.1. The techniques presented in this section give a more
constructive way to guarantee success.
11. Debate Forests and Unrestricted Dialogues
Focused dialogues are restricted, in that they force a single way of support-
ing or defending claims. Instead, in realistic dialogues (of various types) shifts
inter- and intra-topic are likely to occur. In this section we consider unrestricted
dialogues, that may not be focused by allowing multiple ways of supporting or
defending claims (while sticking however to the initial claim). These may be use-
ful to support brain storming and explore different alternative ways to determine
acceptability of claims. We will show that analogous versions of Theorems 10.1,
10.2 and 10.3 hold for such unrestricted dialogues, that thus can be still be used
to determine acceptability of claims.
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(s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[4])
jj
(b,ma : P[9])
44
(c,mr : P[10])
OO
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(k, um : O[11])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
Figure 16: The (non-focused) debate tree drawn from the (non-focused) dialogue in Example 11.1.
Example 11.1. The following dialogue δ
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← p), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← q), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(q ← a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(p← b, c), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, r), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, rl(r ←), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(b), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(c←), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 9, ctr(b, k), 11〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 12〉
is not focused as both utterances 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← p), 2〉 and 〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← q), 3〉
expand s. The (non-focused) debate tree T (δ) is shown in Figure 16. Nonethe-
less, δ is a- and g-successful, as s is admissible and grounded in the framework
Fδ drawn from δ, since there is an argument {b} ` s but no attack against b in Fδ.
To study the acceptability of claims in unrestricted dialogues, we first intro-
duce the notion of arguments being attacked as follows.
Definition 11.1. Given a debate tree T and an argument A drawn from T , A is
attacked in T iff there is a node N = ( ,ma : [ ]) in A such that N has a child
node m in T . We say that the sub-tree rooted at m in T is an attacker of A in T .
Example 11.2. Consider the dialogue δ
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a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, asm(s), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(s, a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, rl(a← q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, rl(a← p), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(q), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 6, asm(p), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 7, ctr(q, b), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 8, ctr(p, c), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 9, rl(b←), 11〉 〈a2, a1, 10, rl(c←), 12〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 13〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 14〉
The debate tree drawn from this dialogue is in Figure 17. Here, the argument
{s} `t s is attacked; and the attacker of {s} `t s is shown in Figure 18 (right).
(s,ma : P[3])
(a,mr : O[4])
OO
(q,ma : O[7])
44
(p,ma : O[8])
jj
(b,mr : P[10])
OO
(c,mr : P[12])
OO
Figure 17: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 11.2.
(a,mr : O[4])
(s,ma : P[3]) (q,ma : O[7])
44
(p,ma : O[8])
jj
(b,ma : P[11])
OO
(c,mr : P[12])
OO
Figure 18: The argument {s} `t s (left) and its attacker (right) for the debate tree in Figure 17.
The notion of attacked differs from the notion of properly attacked given in
Definition 9.2 in two ways:
• Definition 11.1 defines attacked with respect to an argument, or a sub-tree,
of a debate tree, whereas Definition 9.2 defines properly attacked with re-
spect to a single (assumption) node in a debate tree;
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• Definition 11.1 states that an argument is attacked as long as there are some
nodes in the debate tree that are children of the argument, whereas Defini-
tion 9.2 defines an assumption node being properly attacked iff there is an
actual argument that hangs from that node.
Debate trees are insufficient to help determine the acceptability of claims of non-
focused dialogues. We introduce the notion of debate forest, composed of (debate)
trees and defined in terms of the notions of attacked and attacker just given.
Definition 11.2. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, the debate forest
F(δ) drawn from δ is the set of trees Fm(δ) in the sequence F0(δ), F1(δ), . . . ,
Fm(δ) constructed inductively from the pi-pruned sequence δ′ = 〈u′1 . . . , u′m〉
obtained from δ, as follows (below, L,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6= L′):
1. F0(δ) is empty;
2. F1(δ) consists of a single debate tree T 11 (δ), which consists of a single node
(χ, um : P[id1]), where id1 is the identifier of u1 = u′1;
3. Let F i(δ) be the i-th forest consisting of trees T i1 (δ), . . . ,T il (δ), let u′i+1 =
〈 , , t, C, id〉, and let u′t = 〈 , , , Ct, t〉 be the target utterance of u′i+1; then
F i+1(δ) is obtained as follows.
(a) if C = rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βx) then F i+1(δ) is obtained in one of the
following two cases:
i. if there is no debate tree in F i(δ) that contains (β0,mr : P[t]),
then F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) updated as follows:
for each T ij (δ), 0 < j ≤ l in F i(δ) such that T ij (δ) contains
(β0, : L[t]), then
(β1, um : L[id]), . . . , (βx, um : L[id])
are added to T ij (δ) as children of (β0, : L[t]); and if (β0, : L[t])
is (β0, um : L[t]), then it is replaced by (β0,mr : L[t]) in each
T ij (δ) that contains (β0, um : L[t]);
ii. else, F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with k additional debate trees, where k is
the number of debate trees inF i(δ) containing (β0,mr : P[t]); for
each T ij (δ) containing (β0,mr : P[t]), a new debate tree is created
by (1) copying T ij (δ) and (2) replacing all children and sub-trees
rooted at these children of (β0,mr : P[t]) with new children
(β1, um : P[id]), . . . , (βx, um : P[id]);
(b) if C = asm(α) then F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with all T ij (δ) that contain
(α, um : L[t]) with (α, um : L[t]) replaced by (α,ma : L[id]);
(c) if C = ctr(α, β) then F i+1(δ) is obtained as follows:
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i. if there exists no T ij (δ) in F i(δ) such that T ij (δ) contains a node
N = (α,ma : O[t]) where N is in an argument A such that A is
attacked, then F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with all T ij (δ), 0 < j ≤ l , that
contain (α,ma : L[t]) each having a new node (β, um : L′[id]) as
a child of (α,ma : L[t]);
ii. otherwise, F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with k additional debate trees, where
k is the number of debate trees in F i(δ) that contain (α,ma :
O[t]). For each T ij (δ) that contains (α,ma : O[t]), a new debate
tree is created by (1) copying T ij (δ), (2) removing from it the
attacker of the argument that contains (α,ma : O[t]), and (3)
adding (β, um : P[id]) as a child of (α,ma : O[t]).
The construction of the debate forest drawn from the dialogue in Example 11.1
is shown in Figures 19, 20 and 21.
Conceptually, we construct debate forests using the same procedure for con-
structing debate trees, i.e. inserting new nodes and locating parents, etc. However,
since the main purpose of having a debate forest is to ensure that every individual
debate tree in the forest is focused, if we encounter a new utterance u such that
adding u will yield a non-focused debate tree (as in cases 3(a)ii and 3(c)ii), we (I)
duplicate all existing trees in the forest that contain the target of u, (II) remove all
sub-trees of the target of u from the duplications, and (III) “add u” to the dupli-
cated trees. Note that cases 3(a)i, 3(b), and 3(c)i describe “normal” cases where
adding u to the forest will not yield non-focused debate trees.
In this process, it is possible that more trees are duplicated than needed but the
forest is a set, so only a single version of identical trees is kept. Hence, at the end,
we obtain a set of unique trees in a debate forest.
Note that each such tree in the debate forest drawn from a dialogue is a top-
portion of the dialogue tree drawn from the dialogue.
In order to study semantic properties of debate forests, we introduce the con-
cept of sub-dialogues.
Definition 11.3. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ, δ′ is a sub-dialogue of δ iff it is a
dialogue for χ between ai and aj and, for all utterances u in δ′, u is in δ. We say
that δ is the full-dialogue of δ′.
Example 11.3. Two sub-dialogues of the dialogue in Example 11.1 are in tables 5
and 6. The first sub-dialogue (in Table 5) is neither a- nor g-successful as the
proponent fails to defend a, an assumption in the argument {a} ` s. The second
sub-dialogue (in Table 6) is both a- and g-successful as the proponent is able to
construct the argument {b} ` s and defend it (since b is not attacked).
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T 11 (δ)
F1(δ) (s, um : P[1])
T 21 (δ)
F2(δ) (s,mr : P[1])
(p, um : P[2])
OO
T 31 (δ) T 32 (δ)
F3(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p, um : P[2])
OO
(q, um : P[3])
OO
T 41 (δ) T 42 (δ)
F4(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p, um : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(a, um : P[4])
OO
T 51 (δ) T 52 (δ)
F5(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a, um : P[4])
OO
T 61 (δ) T 62 (δ)
F6(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
Figure 19: Construction of the debate forest in Example 11.1 (Part 1).
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T 71 (δ) T 72 (δ)
F7(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r, um : O[7])
OO
T 81 (δ) T 82 (δ)
F8(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
T 91 (δ) T 92 (δ)
F9(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b,ma : P[9])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
T 101 (δ) T 102 (δ)
F10(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b,ma : P[9])
OO
(c,mr : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
Figure 20: Construction of the debate forest in Example 11.1 (Part 2).
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T 111 (δ) T 112 (δ)
F11(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b,ma : P[9])
OO
(c,mr : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(k, um : O[11])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
Figure 21: Construction of the debate forest in Example 11.1 (Part 3).
Table 5: A sub-dialogue of the dialogue in Example 11.1 (part 1).
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← q), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(q ← a), 4〉
〈a2, a1, 4, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, r), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, rl(r ←), 8〉
Table 6: A sub-dialogue of the dialogue in Example 11.1 (part 2).
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← p), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(p← b, c), 5〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(b), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(c←), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 9, ctr(b, k), 11〉
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Note that both example sub-dialogues in Example 11.3 are exhaustive, how-
ever Definition 11.3 does not impose that sub-dialogues are exhaustive.
Sub-dialogues can be used to prove properties of unrestricted dialogues in
that, intuitively, each unrestricted (but exhaustive) dialogue can be understood as
the collection of several independent focused sub-dialogues. Hence, each sub-
dialogue draws a tree in the debate forest drawn from the full (unrestricted) dia-
logue. Thus, as soon as one debate tree is found to be “good”, then the partic-
ular sub-dialogue drawing the debate tree becomes successful, and the full non-
focused dialogue is successful.
Lemma 11.1. Given a debate forest F(δ) drawn from a dialogue δ, each tree in
F(δ) is a debate tree drawn from a focused sub-dialogue δi of δ.
For example, the two debate trees T 111 (δ) and T 112 (δ) in Figure 20 and 21 are
drawn from the sub-dialogues in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
Note that, in the case of unrestricted dialogues, the notion of filtered legal-
move functions is overly strong, in that it imposes filtering across trees in the for-
est, thus ruling out successful dialogues unnecessarily. In order to prove semantic
properties for a wider class of unrestricted dialogues, we relax the definition of
filtered legal-move functions by redefining it with respect to debate forests:
Definition 11.4. A debate forest F(δ) is filtered iff all debate trees in F(δ) are
filtered. A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is filtered iff for every δ ∈ D such that
F(δ) is filtered, for every u ∈ λ(δ), F(δ ◦ u) is still filtered.
This notion of legal-move function is a generalised version of the notion in
Definition 9.5, since a debate tree is a special case of a debate forest that consists
of a single tree. From now on we will assume that filtered dialogues are dialogues
compatible with this generalised notion of filtered legal-move function.
Similarly, patient legal-move functions can be redefined with respect to de-
bate forests as follows. (Again, we assume that dialogues in later discussion are
compatible with the following generalised notion of patient legal-move function).
Definition 11.5. A debate forest F(δ) is patient iff all debate trees in F(δ) are
patient debate trees. A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is patient iff for every δ ∈ D
such that F(δ) is patient, for every u ∈ λ(δ), F(δ ◦ u) is still patient.
We can obtain similar results as for focused dialogues, by using the same
combinations of legal move-functions and outcome functions, as follows.
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Theorem 11.1. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ ∈ D such that δ is λ-exhaustive,
if there is a debate tree T (δi) drawn from a sub-dialogue δi of δ such that δi is
λ-conflict-free, then δ is g-successful and χ is grounded in the ABA framework
Fδ drawn from δ (supported by DEF(T (δi))).
Theorem 11.2. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ ∈ D such that δ is λ-exhaustive for
λ filtered, if there is a debate tree T (δi) drawn from a sub-dialogue δi of δ such
that δi is λ-conflict-free, then δ is a-successful and χ is admissible in the ABA
framework Fδ drawn from δ (supported by DEF(T (δi))).
Theorems 11.1 and 11.2 do not refer to debate forests drawn from dialogues
directly, rather, they specify conditions of sub-dialogues thereof. This is partly
because ωcf is defined with respect to properties of debate trees rather than debate
forest (see Definition 9.4). Though we could overwrite Definition 9.4 and redefine
it with respect to debate forests, we choose not to as the current version of Theo-
rems 11.1 and 11.2 clearly indicates that testing the acceptability of the claim of
an unrestricted dialogue can be reduced to testing the acceptability of the claim of
sub-dialogues that draw debate trees and exhibit desirable properties.
To lift the results for the ideal semantics to unrestricted dialogues, we modify
the notion of ideal outcome function so that it focuses on a sub-dialogue but uses
the ABA framework drawn from the full dialogue to check opponent nodes:
Definition 11.6. Let δ ∈ D, F(δ) be the debate forest drawn from δ and δi be a
sub-dialogue of δ. T (δi) inF(δ) is ideal with respect to δ iff none of the opponent
arguments drawn from T (δi) belongs to an admissible set of arguments in the
ABA framework Fδ drawn from δ. The ideal outcome function ωi is such that,
given δ ∈ D and λ ∈ Λ, ωi(δ, λ) = true iff there exists a sub-dialogue δi of
δ such that ωcf (δi, λ) = true and T (δi) is ideal with respect to δ. A λ-ideal
dialogue is a dialogue δ ∈ D such that ωi(δ, λ) = true.
The following example illustrates the computational advantages of this defini-
tion in the case of unrestricted dialogues.
Example 11.4. Given the dialogue δ:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 0, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 2, asm(a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(a, q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(q), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(q, r), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, rl(r ←), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 3, rl(b← a), 9〉
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T (δ1) T (δ2)
(s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(b,mr : P[3])
OO
(q,ma : O[6])
OO
(a, um : P[9])
OO
(r,mr : P[8])
OO
Figure 22: The debate forest for the dialogue δ in Example 11.4.
the forest F(δ) drawn from δ is shown in Figure 22, where δ1 and δ2 are the
two sub-dialogues that draw the individual debate trees. We can see that δ1 is
ideal in F(δ) as the opponent argument, {q} ` q, drawn from T (δ1), is not in an
admissible set in Fδ, even though δ2 is not “complete” yet as 〈 , , 9, ctr(a, q), 10〉
can still be uttered. Such “early termination” is possible because of the redefined
ideal outcome function.
Theorem 11.3. Given a dialogue Daiaj(χ) = δ ∈ D, if δ is λ-ideal for λ-focused
and filtered, then δ is i-successful and χ is ideal in the ABA framework Fδ drawn
from δ (supported by DEF(T (δ))).
11.1. Illustration: Twelve Angry Men
We modify the dialogue shown in Table 1/Table 2 to illustrate non-focused
dialogues. In Table 2, after a1 making the utterance:
Witness 2 cannot be believed if it has a poor eyesight.
a1 makes another uttrance:
Witness 2 cannot be believed if it has a conflict of interest.
Correspondingly, in Table 1, after the utterance
〈a1, a2, 12, rl(w2 not believable← w2 has poor eyesight), 13〉,
another utterance
〈a1, a2, 12, rl(w2 not believable← w2 has conflict of interest), 14〉
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is added to the dialogue. (Utterances with ID 14, 15 and 16 in the original di-
alogue are then given with ID 15, 16 and 17, respectively.) This modified di-
alogue is not focused, as the new utterance leads to another way of supporting
w2 not believable, which defends the claim boy innocent.
The resulting debate forest contains two debate trees: T1(δ) and T2(δ). T1(δ)
is the debate tree shown in Figure 8. T2(δ) is T1(δ) with node
(w2 has poor eyesight,mr : P[13])
replaced by
(w2 has conflict of interest, um : P[14]).
12. Related Work
Several proposals for argumentation based dialogues exist in the literature. We
briefly review here those that are most closely related to our work.
McBurney and Parsons [27] give an overview of dialogue games for argu-
mentation relaying upon syntax and semantics of dialogue protocols. Our work
can be seen as providing a novel dialogue game for ABA, hence the syntax of
our dialogue is based on ABA and the semantics of our dialogues are standard
ABA semantics. These argumentation semantics can be used to define specialised
semantics for specific dialogue types (such as persuasion and inquiry [43]), e.g.
following the lines of [17, 18, 19, 20].
Black and Hunter [6] present a formal system for inquiry dialogues based
on DeLP [22] as the underlying argumentation framework. Our work differs from
theirs as (1) it defines a mechanism for any type of dialogue whereas they focus on
inquiry dialogues; (2) it uses ABA whereas they use DeLP; (3) it does not force an
agent to disclose all knowledge whereas they force full disclosure of all relevant
knowledge for the purpose of inquiry; (4) it does not force a strict interleaving
whereas they do. In addition to being more general, our model benefits from using
ABA as it makes use of formal soundness results thereof to prove soundness of
dialogues. Moreover, since abstract argumentation is an instance of ABA, our
model also provides a model for abstreact argumentation dialogues too.
Parsons et al [29] examine three notions of relevance in dialogues where utter-
ances are arguments and attacks:
• R1 (every new utterance has a direct impact on the claim),
• R2 (every new utterance directly or indirectly impacts the claim), and
• R3 (every new utterance has a direct impact on the previous one).
Our patient legal-move function and focused legal-move function jointly resemble
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their R1 related-ness. Our related legal-move function has some of the features
of their R2 related-ness in that all related utterances have impact on the claim.
However, our utterances are at a finer granularity level, as they correspond to
rules, assumptions, and contraries, whereas in [29] utterances are at the argument
level, i.e., each utterance contains an argument. Thus, there is no direct mapping
between our work and their relevance.
Prakken [32] defines a formal system for persuasion. The main differences
with our work are: (1) since that work focuses on persuasion dialogues, propo-
nent and opponent roles are pre-assigned to agents before the dialogue whereas
in our work agents can play both roles within the same dialogue; (2) Prakken fo-
cuses on the grounded semantics, whereas we allow admissibility, grounded, and
ideal semantics; (3) his set of utterances refers to arguments and attacks, as in the
case of [29]; (4) he forces the support of arguments to be minimal, whereas we
do not, in the spirit of [13]; (5) he does not allow agents to jointly construct ar-
guments whereas we do. Roughly speaking, in terms of obtaining the soundness
result, i.e., a “successful” dialogue means that the claim of the dialogue is “ac-
ceptable”, there are two main differences between his approach and ours. Firstly,
we rely on mapping our dialogues to abstract dispute trees whereas he uses a
form of labelling. Hence, in our case, “successful” dialogues can be mapped to
“good” abstract dispute trees; whereas, in Prakken’s case, “successful” dialogues
have winning arguments that are labelled in. Secondly, to support non-focused
dialogues, we use debate forests, and show that individual trees in a forest can be
mapped to abstract dispute trees, whereas Prakken puts all arguments into a sin-
gle tree and then identifies a “winning strategy” that represents a sub part of the
single tree. Overall, our definitions allow to leverage on formal results for ABA
(and in particular the connection between abstract dispute trees in ABA and our
debate trees and forests) to formally prove soundness of our dialogue model with
respect to a range of argumentation semantics. It is not clear whether and how this
could be done in the case of Prakken’s trees, as the labels already carry a semantic
connotation and are intrinsically linked to a specific argumentation semantics.
Thang et.al [39] propose a dialogue system for persuasion. Similar to Prakken’s
work, they pre-assign the roles of proponent and opponent to agents participating
in a dialogue. Moreover, they use an annotation scheme similar to Prakken’s
IN/OUT labelling to compute the acceptability of the dialogue. Unlike Prakken’s
work, they have used ABA as their underlying representation and define an ABA-
based dialogue system. Yet, unlike our generic framework composed of various
components (legal-move functions and outcome functions), their work has a lim-
ited focus on persuasion. They point out computational inefficiency of our notion
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of exhaustive dialogue, also present in our earlier work [16], as some utterances
might be repeated in exhaustive dialogues without adding information to the ABA
framework drawn from these dialogues. We believe that this potential loss of ef-
ficiency is a small price to pay if enforcing exhaustiveness helps to define appro-
priate legal-move and outcome functions to establish the correspondence between
debate trees and abstract dispute trees and formally prove soundness. Moreover,
the potential inefficiency can be mitigated in implementations of our dialogues,
where such utterances can be brought about automatically.
Prakken et.al [35] introduce an argumentation dialogue game for analysing
IT security risk assessment, with ASPIC+ [34] as the underlying argumentation
framework, under the grounded semantics. As [32], this work pre-assigns the roles
of proponent and opponent to the two participating agents and uses a version of
the IN/OUT labelling to compute acceptability. Instead of using explicitly defined
structures such as our legal-move functions, this work relies on a single notion of
legal dialogue which, not unlike our outcome functions, serves the purpose of
validating the dialogue by checking that it exhibits desirable properties.
13. Conclusions
We have presented a formal dialogue model for assumption-based argumenta-
tion (ABA) [7, 12, 40]. We use ABA for the representation of arguments and
attacks and for determining “success” of dialogues. ABA is well-suited as a
foundation for argumentation-based dialogues since it is a general purpose, struc-
tured argumentation framework with several applications (e.g. see [12, 40]),
well-understood theoretically (e.g. as an instance of other argumentation frame-
works, notably abstract argumentation [15, 40]) and ASPIC+ [34], and equipped
with provably correct computational mechanisms with respect to several seman-
tics [14, 15, 41] that we rely upon in order to prove our formal soundness results.
We proved that our model is sound by connecting it with the admissibility,
grounded and ideal argumentation semantics for ABA. Thus, our dialogues can
be seen as a distributed mechanism for computing admissible, grounded and ideal
extensions (supporting claims) of argumentation frameworks while these are gen-
erated/jointly constructed. Our dialogue model has two main advantages:
1. Our dialogues meet soundness criteria with respect to different argumen-
tation semantics, obtained by lifting soundness results for the underlying
argumentation framework, ABA;
2. Our model is not tailored to any dialogue type. Indeed, it is generic and flex-
ible as it is composed of many loosely coupled components (i.e., legal-move
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Table 7: Summary of types of dialogues defined/studied in this paper. Here, λfl, λrt, λf , λp, λfi
denote flat, related, focused, patient, and filtered legal move functions, respectively.
Outcome functions Legal-move functions Dialogues Results
ωABA λfl ABA Lemma 5.2
ωex (extending ωABA) λfl, λrt exhaustive Lemmas 8.2, 8.3
ωlw (extending ωex) λfl, λrt defensive
ωcf (extending ωlw) λfl, λrt conflict-free Lemma 9.1
” λfl, λrt, λp,λf , g-successful Theorem 10.1
” λfl, λrt, λp g-successful Theorem 11.1
” λfl, λrt, λp, λfi, λf a-successful Theorem 10.2
” λfl, λrt, λp, λfi a-successful Theorem 11.2
ωi (extending ωcf ) λfl, λrt, λp, λfi, λf i-successful Theorem 10.3
” λfl, λrt, λp, λfi i-successful Theorem 11.3
and outcome functions) that can be freely combined to construct dialogues
with different aims and of different types.
We have assumed that agents exchange their views in ABA-format, namely
ABA serves as a standard for the exchange of information between agents. How-
ever, agents may adopt an internal representation different from ABA.
Our dialogue model relies upon several legal-move functions and outcome
functions. Table 7 summarises the main kinds of dialogues we have defined with
these legal-move and outcome functions, as well as the core properties they enjoy.
Our work opens several avenues for future research, as follows.
We have focused on soundness results only, and ignored the important issue of
completeness. Completeness results for dispute derivations for ABA in [15, 41]
are a useful starting point for studying the completeness of our dialogues.
Our model for argumentation-based dialogues has very clear formal proper-
ties, thanks to the use of ABA and leveraging formal results for its computational
counterparts. It would be interesting to see whether the model could be modified
and/or extended to support argumentation dialogue with respect to other types of
structured argumentation. This may require the need for additional utterances,
e.g., in the case of ASPIC+ [34], conveying preferences by an agent of one rule
over another.
We have only considered two agents, for simplicity. We believe that our model
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naturally generalises to several agents. Indeed, debate trees and forests are com-
pletely neutral as to which agent plays the (fictitious) role of proponent and op-
ponent, and focus instead on the content of utterances. This generalisation would
require extending the turn-making function to accommodate several agents, al-
lowing, in particular, for agents to play different roles within the same dialogue
(e.g. in the case of inquiry [43]) or to stick to a specific role (e.g. in the case of
persuasion [43]) and form coalitions (for and against acceptability of the dialogue
claim). We plan to study this generalisation in the future, taking into account the
challenges raised in the literature [10].
We have focused on three semantics for ABA (although some other semantics,
of preferred and complete extensions, are accommodated for free, as we discuss
at the end of Section 6). It would be interesting to consider other semantics, e.g.
that of stable extensions [11, 7].
For simplicity we have restricted dialogues to be patient, but non-patient dia-
logues could also be used to guarantee successful dialogues.
The soundness results for i-successful dialogues are obtained in a semi-con-
structive manner, by checking that opponent arguments in debate trees do not
belong to admissible sets in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue. It
would be useful to be able to check this condition using dialogues in turn, e.g.
inspired by the notion of Fail-dispute derivation in [15].
We have focused on dialogues that generate flat ABA frameworks. It would
be interesting to see whether the model could be generalised to the case of non-
flat ABA frameworks, and in particular to deal with settings where agents may
disagree on whether a sentence is an assumption or not.
Future work also includes applying our dialogue framework to various dia-
logue types, e.g., negotiation and deliberation, following the lines of [17, 18, 19,
20], and extending our framework to model sequences of dialogues. Although
these initial attempts show promise in the deployment of our general model, much
work is required to explore this challenge in full. An interesting question, for ex-
ample, is whether all forms of deliberation as discussed in [28] can indeed be
supported and/or accommodated.
Finally, it would be interesting to see how our framework can be applied in
human-agent dialogical interactions.
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Appendix A. Glossary
• Utterance (Definition 3.1) is the basic building block in our dialogue model.
• Dialogue (Definition 3.2) is a sequence of utterances.
• Framework drawn from a Dialogue (Definition 3.3) contains all rules, as-
sumptions and contraries disclosed in a dialogue.
• Turn-making Function (Definition 4.1) decides the agent making the next
utterance.
• Legal-move Function (Definition 4.2) specifies how to continue a dialogue.
• Outcome Function (Definition 4.3) allows to determine whether dialogues
have desirable properties.
• Flat Legal-move Function (Definition 5.1) and ABA outcome function (Def-
inition 5.2) ensure that the framework drawn from a dialogue is a flat ABA
framework.
• A-/G-/I-successful Dialogues (Definition 6.1) are dialogues with their claims
being admissible, grounded, and ideal, respectively, in the ABA frameworks
drawn from them.
• Related Utterances (Definition 7.1) are “syntactically” related utterances.
• Top-down Related Utterances (Definition 7.2) are “semantically” related
utterances.
• Top-down Related Legal-move Function (Definition 7.3) ensures “semanti-
cally” related relations between utterances.
• Exhaustive Outcome Function (Definition 7.4) ensures that all utterances
compatible with the used legal-move functions are utteranced in the dia-
logue.
• Debate Tree drawn from Dialogue (Definition 8.1) keeps track of dialogue
progress, for book-keeping purpose.
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• Argument drawn from a Debate Tree (Definition 8.2) defines how to ex-
tracts ABA arguments from debate trees.
• Defence Set and Culprits (Definition 8.3) are proponent and attacked oppo-
nent assumptions from a debate tree.
• In Patient Debate Trees (Definition 9.1) arguments are not attacked until
fully constructed.
• Patient Legal-move Function (Definition 9.1) constructs dialogues drawing
patient debate trees.
• In Last-word Debate Tree (Definition 9.3) all leaves are proponent nodes.
• Defensive Dialogues (Definition 9.3) draw last-word debate trees.
• Conflict-free Outcome Function (Definition 9.4) enforces that there is no
overlap between defence set and culprits.
• Conflict-free Dialogues (Definition 9.4) are defensive dialogues for which
the conflict-free outcome function returns ture.
• In Filtered Debate Trees (Definition 9.5) there is no repeated attack between
arguments. In Filtered Debate Forests (Definition 11.4) all debate trees are
filtered.
• Filtered Legal-move Functions (Definition 9.5, 11.4) construct dialogue
drawing filtered debate trees/forests.
• Properly Attacked Node (Definition 9.2) is an assumption node which has
been attacked by some actual argument.
• Focused Debate Trees (Definition 10.1) contain a single way of defending
their root.
• Focused Legal-move Function (Definition 10.1) constructs dialogues draw-
ing focused debate trees.
• Ideal Debate Tree (Definition 10.3) has the property that none of the oppo-
nent arguments drawn from the tree is admissible.
• Ideal Outcome Function (Definition 10.3, 11.6) returns true iff the debate
tree / forest drawn from a dialogue is ideal.
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• Ideal Dialogue (Definition 10.3, 11.6) is a conflict-free dialogue for which
the ideal outcome function returns true.
• Attacked Argument (Definition 11.1) is an argument n a debate tree with an
assumption node that has a child.
• Debate Forest (Definition 11.2) is a set of debate trees.
• Sub-dialogue (Definition 11.3) is a set of utterances extracted from a dia-
logue.
• Patient Debate Forest (Definition 11.5) is a debate forest containing only
patient debate trees.
• Ideal Debate Forest (Definition 11.6) a debate is forest containing only
ideal debate trees.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5.1. By Definition 5.1, for any β ∈ L, if β ∈ Aδ then there exists
no ρ, such that ρ ∈ Rδ and Head(ρ) = β; and if there exists ρ, such that ρ ∈ Rδ
then β /∈ Aδ. Therefore, Fδ is flat.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Trivial.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Since δ is g-successful, χ is grounded. By definition
of grounded semantics (see Section 2), χ is also complete and admissible. Hence
g-successful implies a-successful. By Theorem 2.1 (iii) of [15], which states that
an ideal set of arguments is a superset of the grounded set of arguments, we have
that g-successful implies i-successful.
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Trivial by definition of ideal semantics (see Section 2).
Proof of Lemma 8.1. It is easy to see that debate trees for related dialogues are al-
ways guaranteed to be well-formed, in that each non-root node in them has exactly
one parent. We show, given a dialogue δ, that this inductive process constructs a
debate tree T (δ) as in Definition 8.1.
Condition 1(a) and 1(b) in Definition 8.1 are trivially true since nodes in
T 0(δ), . . . , T m(δ) are nodes inserted in accordance with utterances in δ hence,
if a sentence β is in a node, then β must be in some utterance in the dialogue.
Condition 1(c) in Definition 8.1 is true as 3(a) and 3(b) in the lemma specify how
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nodes tagged um are replaced by nodes tagged ma and mr. Condition 2(a) through
2(f) in Definition 8.1 are jointly met by 3(a) through 3(c) in the lemma.
Hence, this inductive process yields a debate tree as per Definition 8.1.
Proof of Lemma 8.2. This lemma is trivially true as a node in an actual argument
can be mapped to a node in an ABA argument by 1) dropping the tag and the ID,
and 2) adding nodes τ as children of leaf nodes of the form ( ,mr : [ ]) (as each
of these node represents a rule with an empty body).
Proof of Lemma 8.3. To show S `t β can be drawn from T (δ) is to show all
sentences in S ` β have corresponding nodes in T (δ); and these nodes are con-
nected in the right order with the same label. Let Fδ be 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉. Since δ is
λ-exhaustive, for all sentences β0, β1, . . . , βn ∈ L, if β0 ← β1, . . . , βn ∈ Rδ, then
nodes n0 = (β0, : L[ ]), n1 = (β1, : L[ ]), . . . , n2 = (β2, : L[ ]).
Proof of Lemma 9.1. Assume otherwise, let D = DEF(T (δ)), A,A′ ⊆ D and
A ` c attacking A′ ` c′ in Fδ. By definition of defence set, all assumptions in D
are labelled P. Since δ is λ-exhaustive, by Lemma 8.3, we know that A `t c and
A′ `t c′ are in T (δ). Since A and A′ are in two arguments attacking each other,
they cannot have the same labelling. So either A is labelled P or A′ is labelled P,
but not both: contradiction, since both A and A′ are subsets of D.
Proof of Lemma 10.1. We can transform debate trees into abstract dispute trees.
Given a debate tree T (δ), its equivalent abstract dispute tree T a is constructed as
follows.
1. Delete all nodesN from T (δ) whereN is in a potential argument. Let T ′(δ)
be the result.
2. Modify T ′(δ) by appending a new flag field Z = {0, 1} to each remaining
node in T (δ) and initialise Z to 0 for all nodes, i.e., a node now looks like
( , : [ ])[0]. Let T ′′(δ) be the result.
3. T a is T am in the sequence T a1 , . . . , T am constructed inductively as follows:
• T a0 is empty;
• let A be the argument in T ′′(δ) that contains the root of T (δ). Set the
flags of all nodes in T ′′(δ) that are also in A to 1. Let T ′′1 (δ) be the
result; then T a1 contains a single node that holds A and is labelled by
P;
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• let T ai be the i-th tree, for 0 < i < m, then T ai+1 is T ai with an addi-
tional node L : B, where B is an argument drawn from T ′′i (δ), child of
B′, another argument drawn from T ′′i (δ), such that:
– the flag of at least one node in B is 0;
– the root node of B has a parent node p in T ′′i (δ) with flag equal to
1 and such that p is in B′;
– L is P if the root node of B is a P node, otherwise L is O;
– set the flags of all nodes in T ′′i (δ) that are also in B to 1, let T ′′i+1(δ)
be the result.
4. m is the smallest index such that there is no node in T ′′m(δ) with its flag
equal to 0.
T a constructed above is an abstract dispute tree as follows.
1. Every node of T a = T am contains a single argument as there is no potential
argument in T ′(δ) and T ′′(δ). For each argument, there is a unique node in
T a. Each node in T a is labelled either P or O as arguments drawn from
T (δ) are labelled either P or O.
2. The root node of T a contains the argument that has the claim of the dia-
logue. The root is labelled P by construction of T (δ).
3. By definition of λ-exhaustive outcome function, since δ is λ-exhaustive,
every assumption is attacked in as many ways as possible in Fδ. Hence a P
node in T a has as many children as its attacks by actual arguments.
4. By definition of patient and focused legal-move function, since δ is patient
and focused, there is only one way of attacking an argument labelled by a
O node. By the last-word outcome function, since δ is defensive, there is no
un-attacked argument labelled by a O node. Therefore, every O node in T a
with an assumption has one and only one P node as its child.
Since T a contains the same actual arguments as T (δ) and arguments have the
same P/O labelling in both T a and T (δ), we have DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and
CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a).
Proof of Lemma 10.2. We can transform debate trees into abstract dispute trees
using the procedure as shown in the proof of Lemma 10.1 with a modification.
After deleting all nodes N from T (δ) where N is in a potential argument (step 1),
we replace T (δ) with T E(δ), the expanded debate tree of T (δ). The rest of the
construction of T a remains unchanged.
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It is easy to see that T a constructed with the modified T E(δ) is an abstract dis-
pute tree and DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a), as shown
in the proof of Lemma 10.1.
Proof of Theorem 10.1. Similar to the proof of Lemma 10.1, if ωcf (δ, λ) = true,
then there exists an abstract dispute tree T a such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a)
and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a). As shown in [12], as a direct consequence of
Theorem 3.7 in [25], we obtain that the defence set of a grounded abstract dispute
tree is a subset of the grounded set of arguments. Hence δ is g-successful and χ is
grounded and supported by DEF(T (δ)).
Proof of Theorem 10.2. If ωcf (δ, λ) = true, by Lemma 10.2 there exists an ab-
stract dispute tree T a such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) =
CUL(T a). By Theorem 5.1 of [14], the theorem holds.
Proof of Theorem 10.3. Let Fδ be 〈L,R,A, C〉. From Lemma 10.2, we know
that there is an abstract dispute tree T a for S ` χ for some S ⊆ A. Since δ
is ideal, by Definition 10.3 we know that none of the opponent arguments drawn
from T (δ) belongs to an admissible set of arguments in Fδ. Hence, T a is ideal.
By Theorem 3.4 in [15] the theorem holds.
Proof of Lemma 11.1. We show that (I) the inductive process in Definition 11.2
constructs a set of debate trees (II) each of these is for a sub-dialogue of δ and
(III) each such sub-dialogue is focused.
(I) For each tree T ij (δ) in F i(δ), condition 1(a) and 1(b) in Definition 8.1 are
trivially true as all nodes in each tree are inserted in accordance with utterances
in δ hence if a sentence β is in a node, β must be in some utterance in the di-
alogue. Condition 2(a)-2(f) in Definition 8.1 are met by condition 3(a)-3(c) in
Definition 11.2. Hence, each tree in a debate forest is a debate tree.
(II) Given that F(δ) contains l debate trees T1(δ), . . . , Tl(δ), the sub-dialogue
δi, 0 < i ≤ l, that draws the debate tree Ti(δ) is constructed as follows.
1. δi is initialised to empty;
2. For each node (β, F : [id]) = n in T (δi),
• if uid = 〈 , , t, , id〉 is in δ but not in δi, then add uid to δi;
• let ut be the utterance in δ such that uid is related to ut; if ut is not in
δi, then add ut to δi;
3. Sort δi in the order of utterance IDs.
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It is easy to see that each δi constructed as above is a sub-dialogue of δ and
Ti(δ) is drawn from δi.
(III) Let us consider any sub-dialogue δi from part (II). We first show that δi is
related, and then that it is focused.
δi is related: Trivially δi is and ABA dialogue, given that δ is. We now show
δi is compatible with a related λi ∈ Λ and that ωex(δi, λi) = true.
By Definition 8.1, we know that, in a debate tree, there are 6 ways in which
two nodes N and N ′ can be connected (N is the parent of N ′):
1. N = ( ,mr : L[id]) and N ′ = ( ,mr : L[id′]), or
2. N = ( ,mr : L[id]) and N ′ = ( ,ma : L[id′]), or
3. N = ( ,mr : L[id]) and N ′ = ( , um : L[id′]), or
4. N = ( ,ma : L[id]) and N ′ = ( ,mr : L′[id′]), or
5. N = ( ,ma : L[id]) and N ′ = ( ,ma : L′[id′]), or
6. N = ( ,ma : L[id]) and N ′ = ( , um : L′[id′]),
in which L,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6= L′, id, id′ ∈ ID \ {ID0}. By Definition 7.2, the
utterance uid′ = 〈 , , , , id′〉 is related to the utterance uid = 〈 , , , , id〉 in cases
1, 3, 4 and 6. In cases 2 and 5, there is an utterance ut = 〈 , , id, asm( ), t〉, such
that ut is related to uid and uid′ is related to ut. It can be seen that the previous
construction of δi includes all utterances uid, uid′ and ut but no other utterance.
Hence δi is compatible with a related λi ∈ Λ.
δi is focused: Definition 10.1 defines two conditions for debate trees to be
focused. Condition (a) in Definition 10.1 is met by 3(c) in Definition 11.2 as
this ensures that, in a single tree, a proponent argument is only attacked by a
single opponent argument. Condition (b) in Definition 10.1 is met by 3(a) in
Definition 11.2 as this ensures that, when a proponent node is expanded such
that it has a set of proponent children, then these children must be from a single
utterance.
Proof of Theorem 11.1. Let F(δ) be the debate forest drawn from δ and F(δ)
contains debate trees T (δ1), . . . , T (δn). Given Lemma 11.1, we know all trees in
F(δ) are debate trees drawn from some sub-dialogue of δ and each sub-dialogue
is focused.
Since δi is focused, defensive and conflict-free, δi is g-successful and χ is
grounded in AF i, the ABA framework drawn from δi (By Theorem 10.1). We
need to show χ is also grounded in AF , the ABA framework drawn from δ.
Since δi is g-successful in AF i, then it is not the case that there is an argu-
ments that attacks DEF(T (δi)) that has not been countered attacked in the ABA
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framework drawn from δ. By Definition 11.2 each debate tree in F(δ) repre-
sents a set of arguments that support the claim of δ. Hence each tree contains its
own set of defence set, i.e., DEF(T (δi)) is different from DEF(T (δj)), where
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j. Therefore, if a defence set of a tree is grounded in the
ABA framework drawn from the sub-dialogue, it is also grounded in the ABA
framework drawn from the full-dialogue. Hence δ is g-successful as δi is.
Proof of Theorem 11.2. Similar to the proof of Theorem 11.1, we can show that
properties of δi imply properties of δ.
Since δ is filtered, by Definition 11.4, we know that δi is filtered. Also, by
Lemma 11.1, δi is focused. Hence, by Theorem 10.2, δi is a-successful in AF i
(the ABA framework drawn from δi) and χ is admissible in AF i. Again, by the
construction of debate forest (Definition 11.2), we know that each debate tree in
the debate forest contains its own defence set, so arguments in other trees do not
affect arguments in AF i. Hence, Hence δ is a-successful as δi is.
Proof of Theorem 11.3. Let F(δ) be the debate forest drawn from δ and let
T (δ1), . . . , T (δn) be the trees in F(δ). By Lemma 11.1, all trees in F(δ) are
debate trees drawn from some sub-dialogue of δ and each sub-dialogue is focused.
Since δ is λ-ideal, by Definition 11.6, there is a debate tree T (δi) such that
none of the opponent arguments drawn from T (δi) belongs to an admissible set
of arguments in Fδ.
By Lemma 10.2, there is an abstract dispute tree T a for S ` χ for some
S ⊆ A. Since δ is ideal, T a is ideal. By Theorem 3.4 in [15] the theorem holds.
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